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As an issue affecting the foreign relations of the 
United States and Britain, impressment has been given 
varying emphasis by different authors. This thesis is 
first a chronological outline of the events and 
correspondence that trace the subject. Beyond this basic 
2 
delineation I will consider exactly how important 
impressment was to the two countries. James F. Zimmerman, 
in Impressment of American Seamen, posits that impressment 
was of paramount significance while other authors have 
attempted to down grade it into a status of utter 
inconsequence. This paper will show that the actual 
influence of impressment varied from one time, one set of 
circumstances, to another. Finally, my thesis will attempt 
to show more of the British side of the question, 
heretofore primarily ignored. It will be shown that 
members of the British government had what they felt to be 
perfectly valid reasons for continuing the practice, even 
though it eventually led to war. 
Chapter one serves as an introduction and explanation 
of the legal and historical backgrounds of impressment. 
The chapter also covers the first difficulties the two 
countries had over the issue, when England and France 
nearly went to war in 1787. These would serve as a model 
for the problems to come. 
Chapter two looks into the reasons behind the need for 
impressment and America's argument against it. Britain 
needed men to man the navy, America needed these same men 
for its merchant marine, out of this the basic conflict was 
born. 
Chapter three deals with American efforts to contain 
or eliminate impressment, mostly through acts of Congress 
to protect United States sailors. The problem America had 
with issuing proofs of citizenship and Britain's 
requirement that America issue them began to bring 
impressment to the fore. James Monroe was sent to London 
for talks of which impressment was to be a major topic. 
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Chapter four covers the parallel careers of Monroe, 
United States envoy to London, and Anthony Merry, British 
minister to America. Both men had troubles dealing with 
what they felt were obstinate foreign governments and both 
mens' missions were, in the end, failures. Merry, feeling 
America to be inflating the reaction against impressment, 
paid little attention to the complaints and ended up having 
to deal with harsh anti-British legislation. Monroe's lack 
of success took longer and forms the basis of chapter five. 
This chapter details how the Jefferson administration and 
Monroe were incapable of getting Britain to give an inch on 
the subject. This culminated in the Treaty of 1806, which 
was silent on impressment. 
Chapter six shows how this lack of action set the 
stage for the encounter between the Chesapeake and the 
Leopard. This skirmish almost led to war and represents 
the peak of impressment's importance as an issue in foreign 
affairs. 
Chapter seven details other differences between the 
two countries as they slid toward the War of 1812. 
Impressment was but one of many causes of the conflict, 
though one which both sides contributed to keeping alive. 
Finally, chapter eight covers war-time diplomacy and 
shows how impressment quickly became the only subject the 
two countries were fighting over. Later actions on 
America's part reveal that impressment, as a single 
complaint, was no longer considered a war-worthy topic, or 
even much of a cause for complaint. 
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CHAPTER I 
LEGAL BEGINNINGS, 1787-1795 
In the years following United States independence, 
maritime concerns dominated the young nation's relations 
with Great Britain. As they vied in the commercial arena, 
questions of the carrying trade and neutral rights helped 
push the two countries apart. Yet nothing, it seems, was 
quite as divisive as the problem of impressmento 
Impressment, as it was called, was the primary method Great 
Britain had for staffing its navy. In this early 
non-democratic form of the draft men were simply snatched 
up and forced into service on British ships of war. 
American citizens were often mistakenly taken in these 
roundups due to similarities between the nationalities and 
a lack of adequate proofs of American citizenship. At 
first a seemingly innocuous difficulty, the problem 
persisted through the terms of four American presidents, 
defying resolution, heightening other antagonisms and 
eventually leading to war. 
This thesis provides a narrative of the impressment 
dispute from its origins in 1787 to its somewhat 
inconclusive resolution in 1818. James Zimmerman addressed 
the issue in Impressment of American Seamen, published in 
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1912. Yet Zimmerman overrated the importance of 
impressment as a factor in international relations while 
disregarding issues relating to boundaries and payments on 
loans made before the war. Zimmerman also ignored the 
British side of the controversy. This thesis will show 
that both America and Britain shared responsibility for the 
emerging controversy. The combination of a large British 
navy and a growing American merchant force made the 
impressment dilemma a virtual certainty. 
Impressment as a method of staffing the Royal Navy 
went back so far even the British had no idea of its 
origins. In 1771, Sir William Blackstone, of His Majesty's 
legal force, spoke of the "right" as existing in less than 
certain terms: 
It hath very clearly ... been shewn by sir Michael 
Foster, that the practice of impressing ... is of 
very antient date, and hath been uniformly continued 
by a regular series of precedents to the present 
time ... The difficulty arises ... that no statute 
has expressly declared this power to be in the 
crown ... This method of impressing ... is only 
defensible from public necessity, to which all 
private considerations must give way. 1 
The main legal standing for impressment rested upon the 
fact that it had been done as long as anyone could remember 
and remained the only adequate method for staffing the 
Royal Navy. 
By the time Blackstone wrote his Commentaries on the 
Laws of England during the mid-eighteenth century, 
impressment had fallen out of favor in Britain. The Lords 
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of the Admiralty themselves were "as much averse to the 
present method of pressing as any man can be, and wish some 
better method was established to man His Majesty's ships." 2 
Blackstone documented this general feeling. "The power of 
impressing men," he wrote, "has been a matter of some 
dispute, and submitted to with great reluctance." 3 
Despite such reluctance, impressment continued. The 
British government tended to be very strict about its 
sailors, holding tight to the men who constituted its navy. 
There was no recognition of a subject's right to change his 
allegiance. Blackstone emphatically supported this view. 
"An Englishman who removes to France, or to China," he 
wrote, 
owes the same allegiance to the King of England 
there as at home ... For it is a principle of 
universal law, that the natural born subject of 
one prince cannot by an act of his own- no, not 
by swearing allegiance to another- put off or 
discharge his natural allegiance to the former. 4 
This was, in effect, the closing of a loophole. No matter 
how far flung the British Empire, no British sailor was 
going to weasel out of service to the Crown. 
Using this logic, the British government at first 
refused to accept that American independence freed British 
seamen who had lived in America prior to 1783. At the same 
time the British Navigation Act required that both the 
master and three-quarters of his crew be the same 
nationality as the ship they sailed on. By 1788 British 
officials began to combine these facts to their advantage: 
Edward Burrow, the customs officer at Glasgow, 
reported ... that he had seized the American Ship 
Jenny, guilty of a sensational list of infractions, 
including the composition of her crew: seven 
Americans and four Britons ... Henry Wilckens, of 
that city, told [Lord] Hawkesbury [President of 
the Board of Trade], early in 1790 ... that four 
American vessels had recently called at London 
and had remained unmolested there although the 
master and "every man on board" was British. 5 
Clearly the Admiralty, as much "against" impressment as 
they were, felt themselves literally surrounded by 
deserters simply begging to be pressed back into service. 
This was an attitude that was bound to be troublesome. 
The diplomatic controversy began in 1787 when English 
captains, preparing for war with France, began impressing 
sailors who claimed to be American. Andre Limozin, an 
American minister stationed in France, wrote to Secretary 
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of State Thomas Jefferson in September that "[w]e have been 
informed yesterday ... that there is now a general Press for 
the Sailors thro all England. " 6 And by mid-October he 
could relate the specific instance of a British tobacco 
ship that had just arrived from Virginia: 
The ship has an American crew, or so they declare 
under oath ... but the master, hearing that all 
British officers are called home, intends to proceed 
to London and threatens when in Liquor (which case 
happens to be often) to deliver the whole crew on 
board British men of war. 7 
5 
Such narrations illustrated how easy it was for an 
American, seemingly indistinguishable from a subject of the 
Crown, to end up serving on a British ship of war. 
Jefferson promptly instructed Limozin to protect 
American sailors "against being carried against their will 
to England, where they will certainly be impressed to serve 
against France, and, if taken prisoner by the latter, may 
perhaps be hung as pyrates."8 Again, Jefferson showed the 
peril of these sailors who, once forced against their will 
to fight for England, could then be hanged as war criminals 
by France. What he did not address was the general 
ineffectuality of the American envoys in securing the 
release of wrongly impressed men. 
By the time Jefferson's message arrived the danger of 
war between France and Britain had blown over. Still, the 
pattern was set. In fact, the incident Limozin spoke of 
was an almost classic example of the impressments to come. 
First there would be an instance of arbitrary British 
impressment, usually by an irascible and dictatorial 
British captain. Then the pressed sailors claimed with 
little or no proof that they were American. After an 
ineffectual response from the American government which 
left the greater question of impressment unresolved, a 
beleaguered American official in a foreign port would 
"demand" the sailors release. The sailors would, of 
course, not be released, or at least not for some time. 
This pattern recurred again and again throughout the 
twenty-five or so years of the impressment controversy. 
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In early 1790, war between France and Britain loomed 
once more on the horizon and retired Senator John Rutledge 
wrote Jefferson from London that "three thousand seamen had 
been pressed the night before." 9 This was not as 
astounding as it sounds. The press gangs often operated in 
such sweeps. However, many of the pressed were American, 
or claimed to be, and Rutledge soon ran up against what was 
to become the recurring problem of inadequate proof of 
American citizenship. "In general, the press officers have 
objected to the proofs offered of [our sailors] being 
Americans." Rutledge wrote, adding that he hoped merchants 
would convince their captains to obtain proper citizenship 
papers for their sailors. 10 
The very question of such certificates was to become a 
key stumbling block to the resolution of impressment. In 
the years to come, America would offer detailed refusals of 
the plan. At this point Rutledge's advice was simply 
ignored, thereby allowing the impressments to go on 
unhindered. "A merchant of Boston," wrote William Short, 
the american minister to France, "assured me there had been 
more than three hundred American sailors impressed into the 
British service." 11 American consuls Nathaniel Barrett and 
David Humphreys concurred. Barrett wrote, "Every vessel 
which arrives is subject to the Inconvenience of having her 
7 
men taken out and in many instances conveyed out of the way 
of redress. " 12 
Humphreys voiced even stronger concern. "No vessel 
arrives from any Port that is not entirely stript of its 
Crew by the Press Gangs." 13 
It was easy to get worked up over the problem as not 
only was the fate of the sailors horrendous but the 
impressments themselves were relentless. The somewhat 
frenzied response of the American consuls would be repeated 
by other Americans on both sides of the Atlantic in years 
to come. 
The Foreign Office and the Admiralty responded to such 
charges by arguing that it was almost impossible to tell an 
American sailor from a British counterpart. Jefferson's 
informant in London, John Brown Cutting, wrote to the 
Secretary of State in July of 1790 telling of his attempts 
to discuss the matter. "I was told there was much 
difficulty in discriminating an American from a British 
seaman: that many British attempted to pass for 
Americans. " 14 Finally, in November, consul Joshua Johnson 
informed Jefferson about his talks: 
I have had some conversation with the Duke of 
Leeds' Secretary ... on the Subject of what 
Constitutes an American Subject, and that of 
an English one; his answer was that the similarity 
of manners, language etc. put it out of the power 
of Government to discriminate. 15 
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This similarity was separately noted by others. George 
Hammond, first British minister to America, wrote to 
President Washington, warning that "[t]he practice in Great 
Britain of impressing seamen whenever war is apprehended, 
will fall more heavily on yours than ... any foreign nation, 
on account of the similarity of language. " 16 Confusion 
between the nationalities was compounded by the fact that 
British sailors wishing to escape military service often 
obtained faulty American citizenship papers and then signed 
on board United States' merchant ships. Even as late as 
1794 Lord Grenville, the British Foreign Secretary, could 
complain to John Jay that, "Such cases have occasionally 
arisen ... especially where there so often exists an interest 
and intention to deceive. " 17 Though there were many reasons 
for British sailors to sign on to American trade vessels, 
safety was a prime motive. 
The British seaman's bent toward desertion was 
encouraged by many Americans. The carrying trade between 
the West Indies and Europe was primarily in American hands, 
a development which drew large numbers of British sailors 
into the American merchant service. British seamen were 
urged to desert by American merchants in every port in the 
States. In fact, every British Government packet which 
entered New York harbor during the winter of 1801 lost 
almost its entire crew. These deserters easily obtained 
fake citizenship papers . 18 
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The official American line on persuasion to desert was 
quite different. Thomas Jefferson claimed, "You ask, what 
encouragements are given to emigrants by the several 
States? No other than a permission to become citizens." 
However, even Jefferson had to admit that the rules for 
granting citizenship were "not uniform" in the United 
States. 19 In 1790, Lord Hawkesbury voiced his anger over 
what he termed American "nurseries of seamen" although he 
felt that "this evil is also without remedy. "20 And in 
1794, after the start of the Anglo-French War, George 
Hammond admitted that America used "every artifice ... to 
induce British Seamen to desert from the Ships on which 
they arrive. " 21 Although these accounts are somewhat 
exaggerated there can be no doubt that Americans were 
vigorously involved in the attempt to encourage desertion. 
Such behavior undoubtedly led to bad feelings in the 
British Admiralty and contributed to various delays and 
evasions in the release of wrongly impressed men. Still, 
impressment was not yet a foreground issue. With no truly 
serious incident to get excited about, the American 
government remained calm, merely making a few less than 
strenuous efforts to limit the practice. The only people 
truly concerned seemed to be American consuls who spent a 
large portion of their time in the attempt to free American 
sailors. It was these men who stressed the need for 
certificates of citizenship as a prevention from 
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impressment. Joshua Johnson wrote to Jefferson telling of 
his plan to give out a general protection to every American 
citizen on the back of their shipping articles. 22 Their 
advice was ignored at best, disagreed with at worst. 
In July of 1792, Jefferson ordered American minister 
to Britain Thomas Pinckney to open talks on impressmente 
Jefferson had rejected the idea of requiring American 
sailors to carry proof of citizenship feeling it would 
weaken their legal standing: 
We entirely reject ... that our seamen should 
always carry about them certificates of their 
citizenship. This is a condition never yet 
submitted to by any nation ... [Through the] loss 
of this paper evidence ... the British government 
would be armed with legal authority to impress 
the whole of our seamen.n 
This argument would dominate American relations with 
Britain for the next generation, though whether Jefferson 
worried about the loss of citizenship papers or the loss of 
much needed British sailors is not clear. 
Pinckney met with Lord Grenville to deliver 
Jefferson's plan. !'I then proposed to him the plan which 
you suggested of letting the Vessels protect a certain 
number of men according to their tonnage." Specifically, 
America was willing to let British officers check the 
number of men on United States ships as long as no press 
gangs would come aboard unless there were more men than the 
listed amount. Naturally, this was unacceptable: 
He said the obvious objection to this proposal 
was that in case of war with any other nation 
[American] vessels would afford such protection 
to [British] sailors as would induce them to 
crowd into our Vessels to the manifest injury 
both of their royal navy and merchant service.~ 
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The British government insisted that the number of sailors 
on board a ship had very little to do with the number of 
British sailors it carried. It could ill afford to let 
American vessels pass unmolested simply because their crew 
was listed as thirty men and that was how many were there. 
Despite the complaints of America's foreign ministers, 
at this point impressment was far from the head of the list 
when it came to Anglo-American discord. On March 5, 1794 
Jefferson's successor as Secretary of State, Edmund 
Randolph, gave Congress a report on foreign aggressions 
against American commerce. Though impressment was 
mentioned it was only one of several anti-British charges, 
all of which were given a corresponding French grievance. 25 
The lack of interest in the topic is further 
demonstrated by the response in the House of 
Representatives to a bill to protect American sailors. 
Issued in the spring of 1794, the bill moved to "enable 
American seamen to obtain and carry evidence of 
citizenship, for the purpose of protecting them from 
impressment into foreign service. " 26 It was the infamous 
proof of citizenship that Jefferson had already turned 
down. After a month, the bill was debated. "Mr. 
Fitzsimmons was against the bill ... because every man ... who 
12 
has not a certificate, will, in future, if the law takes 
place, be considered as not American." 27 A suspiciously 
Jeffersonian statement. Murray defended his bill, "It was 
not his intention," he said, "to promise a complete system 
in this desirable point. His wish was rather to secure the 
advantages which certainly were within our reach." 
Whatever the advantages were to Murray's admittedly 
incomplete plan they were undoubtedly less than apparent. 
The bill was voted down the same day. 28 
Only America's foreign officials were inclined to 
treat the problem as if it had any need to be resolved. 
John Jay was in Britain at the time working on the Treaty 
of Amity, Commerce and Navigation. Though his instructions 
contained nothing on impressment he broached the topic 
anyway. On July 23, 1794, Jay tried to pressure Lord 
Grenville into giving on impressment rather than have 
negative public opinion in America jeopardize their treaty 
negotiations: 
The cases of captures transmitted to me are 
numerous ... It appears to me unfortunate that the 
vessels lately sailed from hence to America carry 
with them discontents on account of Americans 
impressed and detained. Those discontents will 
naturally add to the impressions made by masters 
of vessels and others daily returning from the 
West Indies, and publishing details of the 
severities which they there experienced. 30 
Soon after, on July 30, Jay again expressed the hope, "that 
[impressed] Americans ... be immediately liberated, and that 
persons ... with His Majesty's commissions do, in future, 
abstain from similar violences. " 31 
Grenville agreed that wrongful impressment was 
unfortunate but stopped short of throwing out the 
traditional method Britain had of manning its navy: 
On the subject of the impress ... if ... American 
seamen have been impressed ... it has been contrary 
to the King's desire ... With respect to the desire 
expressed by Mr. Jay that new orders might be 
given with a view to prevent ... [wrongful 
impressment), Lord Grenville has ... obtained 
His Majesty's permission to assure Mr. Jay, 
that instructions, to the effect desired, will 
be renewed.n 
In other words, nothing was going to happen. The only 
13 
headway Jay made was to get Grenville to finally agree that 
those resident in America at the moment of independence 
were American citizens: 
I do not think one instance can be brought 
where a seaman has not been discharged, who 
could produce ... any probable ... ground for 
supposing him a native citizen of the u.s., 
or a resident there at the time of the separation 
from (Great Britain].n 
There were however, numerous incidents of American sailors 
who had died in the service of the Royal Navy while engaged 
in years-long battles to regain their freedom. 
Paradoxically, as the other issues in Anglo-American 
relations reached a settlement, impressment began to 
worsen. In November of 1794 Jay and Grenville signed the 
Treaty of Amity, Commerce and Navigation and the two 
countries were placed on a more amicable basis than ever. 
14 
Just weeks later the Royal Navy would again need a surplus 
of men for the just renewed war with France. Impressment 
would increase dramatically, and jump to the forefront of 
United States-British diplomacy. 
CHAPTER II 
THE MANNING PROBLEM 
The dispute over impressment was caused by an acute 
shortage of sailors. There simply were not enough trained 
and able-bodied seamen to staff both the growing American 
merchant fleet and the British royal navy while it was at 
war with France. Beyond this shortage the royal Navy faced 
a further obstacle. The Navigation Act stipulated that 
every British merchant ship maintain a staff that was at 
least three-quarters British. 1 Though Parliament reduced 
the percentage to one-quarter for the duration of the war 
there still weren't enough sailors. 2 By end of the 
eighteenth century the British navy was twice as large as 
it had been fifty years before. There were approximately 
250 ships in service in 1700, this number had risen to just 
over 500 by the year 1790. 3 
The type of man who could be pressed was strictly 
regulated. So-called "landmen" were ineligible. In 1776, 
Lord Mansfield, the Chief Justice, had ruled: 
Persons liable must come purely within the 
description of seamen ... He ... who is not within 
the description does not come within the usage. 
The commission is not to impress landmen. 4 
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Which was about as clear as it got. To top off the 
Admiralty's problems, the practice was decidedly unpopular, 
both abroad and at home. 
Originally the term "gang" meant a group of sailors 
assigned to a specific task. The activities of the press 
gangs gave the word the negative and violent connotations 
it carries today. The violence, however, was not always 
perpetrated by the gangs themselves. In the absence of any 
real police force press gangs often found themselves 
subject to verbal and physical harassment. In 1803 one 
captain told of how his gang of men, "were attacked by 
large mobs, principally women, who by throwing things hurt 
several officers and rescued several men. 115 
Another officer in charge of a press gang wrote: 
On one occasion I was assaulted by a shower of 
brickbats: on another, a volley of either musket 
or pistol balls was fired into my room one evening 
as I was reading at my table. 6 
Clearly, British subjects may have loved their King, but 
they hated his press gangs. Because of the hardships 
associated with pressing on land the gangs often found it 
easier to do their work at sea. In 1795 the Admiralty had 
a force of 528 sailors at Dover just for this purpose. 7 
While Britain's navy suffered under this lack of 
sailors the government continued to receive reports of 
British sailors aboard "divers Foreign ships."g Something 
had to be done. Early in April, 1795 an Order in Council 
put an embargo on all foreign ships in British ports. 9 
On receiving the Order, Admiral William Parker, 
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commander of the undermanned Jamaica Station, insisted all 
foreign ships be: 
thoroughly examined ... particularly Americans, for 
the purpose of detecting English Seamen that may 
be concealed on board ... you are to cause them to 
be taken out, as also Such as have not Certificates 
of Citizenship. 10 
This would seem to be a rather transparent ploy for the 
quick acquisition of as many able-bodies seamen as Parker 
could lay his hands on. The Admiral's need for these men 
was mostly due to deaths among his own sailors from 
disease, a problem for which Jamaica Station was infamous. 
In 1745 the Admiralty had punished one commander for 
"letting his Men know the Service he was going in, which 
resulted in total desertion." 11 The Admiral's anti-American 
prejudice is a different question. It seems likely to have 
come from a combination of actual experience of American · 
'recruitment' efforts and reports from the home office. 
In defense the United States government charged that 
short-handed British officers would deliberately impress 
Americans. Secretary of State James Madison wrote angrily 
to Rufus King: 
The complaints daily arriving at this office 
show that our mariners are impressed without 
the least respect for their legal protections, 
certified in the most authentic forms ... It cannot 
be pleaded that the seamen in question were taken 
18 
in vessels where they had entered voluntarily ... These 
wrongs have made a deep impression on the American 
mind. 12 
However, what Madison referred to as "authentic" forms of 
certification were often the most woefully inadequate and 
poorly documented of "proofs". 
The British government vigorously denied deliberate 
impressment, stating that they had no desire "to acquire 
American seamen." England's object was the "much broader 
and more important one of guarding herself from being 
deprived of her own. " 13 However, only rarely did an abusive 
British officer to get so much as a scolding. 
The Anglo-French War eventually drew in Holland and 
Spain as well leaving most of the European colonial trade 
in American hands. Three years before the war, American 
ships carried 59 percent of the nation's foreign trade. By 
1795 the proportion had increased to 90 percent. 14 American 
shipping could only expand this dramatically through the 
liberal use of foreign sailors. Thus, America's refusal, 
indeed inability, to cease in the employment of British 
sailors contributed substantially to the dispute. 
Increased demand for sailors caused the British to raise 
the pay of their seamen to lure deserters back. 15 The 
United States was not oblivious to the economic threat to 
the well-being of its merchant fleet. Joshua Johnson wrote 
to Thomas Jefferson: 
It has occurred to me that granting Protection to 
individuals, they may make use of them to the 
prejudice of the Navigation and Commerce of 
our Country, by entering in the Service of those, 
who will pay the highest Wages, the English now 
give Three pounds five shillings Sterling per 
Month, while the Americans only give thirty-Six 
Shillings. 16 
Here was yet another reason not to give sailors 
protections. A protected sailor was a safe sailor, in 
19 
effect, a free agent able to work for whom he chose. Such 
arrangements appeared to threaten American maritime 
interests. 
Consul William Knox also saw the inherent economic 
danger and wrote to Jefferson from Dublin: 
It is an object of great consequence to American 
commerce for regulation between the United States 
and England determining American citizenship 
exclusive of birth. 17 
Knox expressed a sentiment typical of America's foreign 
ministers, the desire for adequate proofs of citizenship. 
Typically, he was ignored. 
The pay on British merchant vessels also rose at this 
time. While wages in the 1740's were rarely more than 
forty-two shillings, during the war they rose as high as 
sixty shillings per month. 18 Britain still found herself 
short of sailors. It would seem then, with pay being so 
much higher in the British navy, that the real attraction 
was absconding from military service. Though British 
merchant ships paid more than their American counterparts 
they were also based in England. This proximity to the 
20 
home country undoubtedly made a man's chances of 
impressment appreciably greater. Once a man was impressed 
he was placed on a war ship and taken to battle which was a 
dangerous and uncertain way to make a living. Though the 
pay was more, you had to be alive in order to spend it. 
Early in 1807, Secretary of the Treasury Albert 
Gallatin conducted a study to see if America could afford 
to stop using British sailors. He found that half the 
seamen on United States vessels were British. Americans 
"recruited 2, 500 British sailors every year. " 19 Jefferson 
replied, "Your estimate of the number of foreign seamen in 
our employ, renders it prudent ... to drop the idea of any 
proposition not to employ them. 1120 
Indeed, America never did stop in her efforts to 
entice British sailors into service on her merchant 
vessels. British officials reported in later years that 
nearly every British war ship that landed in America lost 
part of her crew. Admiral Sir Hyde Parker, commanding the 
Jamaica Station from 1796 to 1801, claimed it was 
"perfectly well known to us that two-thirds of the Seamen 
that Navigate the American Trade are ... English seamen. " 21 
Any officer who felt this way, and many seemed to, was 
unlikely to give a sailor with inadequate proof of 
citizenship the benefit of the doubt. 
The British government was arbitrary in their use of 
the impressment system. If even British subjects were 
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enraged by the practice it seems only natural that 
Americans would be all the more upset. They were. Yet the 
Admiralty continued on with impressments, justifying them 
as the only way to man the all-important royal navy. 
The American government also carried its share of the 
blame. By refusing to stop the corrupt and illegal methods 
by which British sailors magically became American citizens 
the United States government appeared to support, and off 
the record did support those actions. 
CHAPTER III 
THE AMERICAN RESPONSE 
Just as no British government ever seriously 
considered stopping impressment, no United States 
administration ever admitted to Britain's right to impress 
on the high seas. American arguments came from different 
angles but always agreed that the practice was 
unacceptable. 
President John Adams denied Britain's right because of 
the complete absence of any such right in writings on the 
law of nations: 
There is no principle under heaven, by which 
they can justify taking by force ... even a deserter 
from their own army or navy ... the thing has 
absolutely no principle. 1 
This was notwithstanding the British 'legal' defense 
previously discussed. While this defense is rather shaky 
it apparently worked for the Admiralty. 
Thomas Jefferson believed that a merchant vessel was 
part of the territory of a sovereign state, though he never 
made his beliefs official. 
I write this, too ... that it may not be considered 
as official, but merely my individual opinion ... On 
an element which nature has not subjected to the 
jurisdiction of any particular nation ... it would 
seem that the particular portion ... occupied by the 
vessel of any nation ... is for the moment, the 
exclusive property of that nation, and with the 
vessel, is exempt from intrusion by any other. 2 
Jefferson was thus claiming the high seas to be the 
sovereign territory of any ship traveling on them at a 
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given moment. Under this somewhat radical view, to board a 
United States merchant ship on the high seas would be the 
equivalent of an invasion of American territory. An act of 
war. 
News of increased impressments reached America at the 
same time debate began in the Senate on Jay's Treaty. The 
two issues quickly became intertwined. Anti-treaty forces 
latched on to impressment, loudly decrying the lack of a 
section in the treaty against the practice. This, they 
said, was reason enough not to ratify the agreement. 3 
Jay warned "the forming of any very satisfactory 
arrangement" on impressment would "prove an arduous task"4 
but, probably due to his personal feelings on the subject, 
he recommended the attempt be made. The focus on 
impressment as a tool to fight the treaty brought the issue 
to many people's attention for the first time. The result 
was a flurry of Congressional activity. Edward Livingston, 
an opponent of the treaty, suggested on February 19, 1796, 
that the House appoint a committee: 
To enquire ... whether any and what Legislative 
provision is necessary for the relief of such 
American seamen as may have been impressed" and 
"to report a mode of furnishing American seamen 
with such evidence of their citizenship as may 
protect them from foreign impressment. 
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Such a committee was formed and on February 25 recommended: 
A plan to afford [impressed sailors] relief, 
the principle part of which is that two agents 
shall be appointed by the United States, one to 
be sent over to England and the other to the West 
Indies ... to release such as they are able ... and 
learn the number of citizens who have been 
illegally seized. 6 
With the new interest in impressment it was now necessary 
not just to fight the impressments but also to accurately 
determine just how bad the problem was. 
on March 1 the resolution carried. 7 The first Act for 
the Relief and Protection of American Seamen was the 
result. The act came to a vote in the House of 
Representatives on March 28, 1796. As the act's chief 
proponent, Congressman Livingston declared "there could be 
no doubt that American seamen had been impressed and very 
grossly abused." Thus the act was sorely needed. It was 
hard to argue with such basic logic. After Livingston's 
lengthy speech "the question was decided in the 
affirmative- yeas 77, nays 13."8 
In an attempt to halt the problem entirely the act 
included a list of proofs required to establish a man as an 
American citizen. "The certificates which would be issued 
would be descriptive of the kind of citizenship of its 
possessor." 9 These descriptions were dropped by a joint 
House-Senate committee. 
Instead of having certificates issued to three 
descriptions of American citizens, viz: natives, 
foreigners who were in this country in 1783, and 
those who have obtained their citizenship since, 
they are all to be included under the head of 
American citizens. 10 
These, however, were the kind of distinctions Britain 
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required, so the certificates called for were to be no real 
protection at all. 
Blissfully unaware of this, the Senate began 
consideration the next day. By April 19 the Senate had a 
bill they liked, but not the one that had passed the House. 
Rather than making a strong statement in favor of United 
States sovereignty and neutral rights they simply said it 
was "the duty of the master of every ship ... of the United 
States, any of the crew whereof shall have been 
impressed ... immediately to make a protest. " 11 As if masters 
of ships typically would not make a protest while their 
sailors were hustled away. The watered down bill, which 
also eliminated all mention of proofs of citizenship, 
passed the Senate on April 20. 12 Not surprisingly, this 
useless act did not suffice to quiet the House. On May 28: 
The Speaker laid before the House a letter which 
he had received from ten American captains, now ... 
at Jamaica complaining of the illegal impressment 
of their seamen by British ships of war ... They 
pray for the interference of Government. 13 
No interference was forthcoming, but the incident did serve 
to keep the topic of impressment fresh in the Congressmen's 
minds. 
A few months later Congressman William Vans Murray 
moved to amend the existing act to require seamen to 
produce a birth or baptismal record from their home along 
with the testimony of a witness. One of the specifically 
stated reasons for this revision of the act was: 
Two clauses had been omitted in the bill for 
the protection ... of American Seamen. They were 
the clauses respecting certificates, on which 
the two Houses had differed in opinion. 14 
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This was perhaps the only attempt at setting guidelines for 
American citizenship papers that met with no opposition. 
Quite the opposite. On March 1, 1797 an attempt was made 
to make the requirements for American citizenship even 
stricter. 
Mr. Harper spoke at considerable length 
against the mode laid down for the ascertaining 
of citizenship, which was to be proved ... by 
one credible witness. Mr. Harper proposed that 
the testimony of three freeholders should be 
necessary. 
This proved to be too much even for the House where the 
proposal was immediately negatived, garnering a mere three 
votes. 15 Though the House passed the amendment on March 2 , 
1797, the Senate put off any action until the next session 
effectively tabling the bill. 16 
At this time Rufus King was sent to Britain as 
America's new minister. Secretary of State Madison's 
initial instructions refrained from asking him to strongly 
protest impressment. Privately, Madison claimed to be 
satisfied with Anglo-American relations. "The present 
policy of the British government treats the United States 
with more respect and conciliation than heretofore." 17 
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Nevertheless, on August 10, King, newly arrived in London, 
told Lord Grenville that America wanted to renew talks 
about impressment. His government "thought after fair 
reflection ... that we were entitled to pass the high seas 
without interruption. 1118 
Grenville replied that he would have to discuss it 
with the First Lord of the Admiralty before he could speak 
on the topic. This was undoubtedly because of the ever 
growing evidence that United States officials would sell 
citizenship to anyone who could afford it. In the House of 
Commons it was announced: 
In ... New York ... the collector one day allowed 
an old woman to qualify a whole host of seamen ... 
by swearing that she knew they were American 
citizens ... The very clerk remonstrated against 
[the transaction's] baseness ... The reply of the 
collector was that it was no business of his ... and 
the old woman continued during the whole of the 
day to receive her two dollars for every oath that 
she took ... In Philadelphia occurrences of a similar 
nature had taken place. 19 
Instances of such flagrant abuses were far from rare in 
America's headlong rush to gather the sailors of the world 
into her merchant fleet. Because of such behavior Britain 
felt justified in using whatever means necessary to regain 
their lost sailors. The British government armed Grenville 
with a report from the law office to the effect that a 
belligerent was entitled to remove his own subjects from on 
board a neutral vessel.w The battle was joined again. 
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As a Senator, King had always had his doubts about the 
efficacy of the American system of citizenship proofs. Now 
he found his reservations justified. 21 The British, 
predictably, put little stock in these easily obtainable 
certificates. Lord Grenville asked King to tell the 
American consuls in Britain that they were exceeding their 
authority by issuing them. 
I have considered the proposals, contained in 
your letter ... It seems scarcely possible for the 
King's government to accede to any arrangement 
grounded on such a basis, without risking the 
total sacrifice of that on which depends the 
whole maritime force of Great Britain.n 
The American certificates were thus felt to be too weak for 
Britain to even consider using them as a basis for limiting 
impressment. 
King complied with Grenville's request, holding out 
the vain hope that Congress might toughen its useless law. 
He wrote to Jonathan Dayton, Speaker of the House, a month 
after he'd heard from Grenville. 
I must request you to consider ... the provisions 
of the act of Congress ... respecting the 
certificates of citizenship ... The act does not 
in any manner specify the nature of the proof on 
which these certificates are to be granted ... It 
is not required by the law ... that the certificate 
should distinguish ... the grounds upon which it is 
granted.D 
His request was not considered and the problem then went on 
for some time with consuls continuing to issue their 
worthless protections which Britain continued to ignore. 
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In August, 1797, Grenville dogmatically stated that 
certificates issued by United States consuls would not "be 
considered ... as affording any evidence of the birth or 
Citizenship of the persons exhibiting them. " 24 Even this 
had little effect. As late as 1806, Thomas Jefferson could 
write to Madison: 
I think it would be proper to send to [the 
collectors] a copy of the papers respectively 
concerning them ... as to admonish them to be 
scrupulously exact in their issuing certificates 
of citizenship, as the contrary conduct disgraces 
us.~ 
Which was an interesting comment since the "disgrace" had 
by then been going on for some ten years. 
Congressman Livingston, a hard man to keep quiet on 
the subject, made a final attempt to solve the protections 
difficulty. In December of 1797 he reminded the House of 
William Vans Murray's attempt to amend the Act for the 
Protection of American Seamen: 
That a bill passed the House in February last, for 
the relief and protection of American Seamen, but 
not being acted upon by the Senate, he found it 
would be necessary to bring forward the business 
anew in the House.u 
Which he proceeded to do in a most unique manner. 
Livingston attempted to make captains financially 
responsible for their crew. His amendment required 
"masters of vessels to give bond to bring back, or give a 
due account of all the sailors they take out on their 
voyages." This sort of amendment was bad for business and 
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thus bound to be unpopular. Consideration was postponed 
because of various objections and after February, 1798 the 
amendment was never discussed again. 27 In fact, the entire 
matter idled for most of the rest of the year until an 
incident at Cuba again excited interest. 
On December 31, 1798, Congressman Harrison Otis 
introduced into the House: 
a report ... relative to the impressment of a 
number of American seamen from a vessel of war 
of the United States [the Baltimore] into an armed 
ship of Great Britain. 
It was a case similar to the impressments in the West 
Indies which had first brought impressment to the attention 
of Congress. Now the new announcement had a similar 
effect. The House immediately request ed the President 
send them any pertinent information on this case. 28 By 
January 8, 1799, Congress received a letter sent to the 
Secretary of State by George Morton, U.S. consul at Havana 
"of the partial capture of an American fleet under the 
convoy of the Baltimore sloop-of-war." Morton included a 
letter from Lewis Trezevant and William Timmons who 
witnessed the incident, though they were not on board the 
Baltimore. 
Captain Phillips ... informed us that ... the 
Commodore had told him that he should take out 
of the Baltimore all such men as had not American 
protections ... he had remonstrated against (the 
Commodore] ... as not even those who were really 
Americans ... could show protections, because it 
was always thought that our flag, on board of a 
Government ship, was a sufficient protection. 
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Of course, it was not, and the captain must have known it. 
In the end fifty-five men were removed from the Baltimore, 
though all but five were returned.~ 
When the facts were known the case seemed less 
substantial and appears to have had scant impact. Congress 
did pass a new version of the protection Act in February, 
1799 and the Senate approved it in March. 30 Unfortunately 
the only revision was a request that the Secretary of State 
submit an annual report on impressments. 31 
At the same time, Rufus King had finally had enough of 
Lord Grenville's evasions. Discouraged, he wrote to 
Secretary of State Timothy Pickering in July: 
I have attempted again and again ... without 
success to convince this Government that both 
Justice and a friendly Policy required of them 
to agree with us in a Convention ... that should 
at the same time give to them as well as to us 
adequate and reasonable security in regard to our 
respective Interests ... I have ceased to urge it 
from a full persuasion that my Exertions would be 
fruitless.n 
Despite these words from their own envoy it is apparent 
that the American government was as unconcerned as the 
British. Not until December 12, 1800 was the subject again 
broached in the Senate. 
The Vice-President laid before the Senate a 
report from the Secretary ... of state, in pursuance 
of the 'Act to revive and continue in force certain 
parts of the act for the relief and protection of 
American seamen' ... and the report was read, and 
ordered to lie for consideration. 33 
No such act was passed. 
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The Peace of Arniens in 1801 ended British-French 
aggression and pushed impressment even farther into the 
background. However, United States agents in Great Britain 
had unexpected difficulties obtaining the release of 
captured sailors. One such agent, David Lenox, wrote to 
Secretary of State Madison in March, 1802. "I had, with 
you, anticipated the discharge of all seamen claiming 
protection as American citizens, on peace taking place ... In 
this I have been disappointed. " 34 Though Britain now had no 
immediate need of the impressed sailors the government 
could not afford to relax their stance on the impressment 
issue. Lenox wrote to Even Nepean of the Admiralty Office: 
! ... send you ... a list of 558 seamen, representing 
themselves to be citizens of the United States of 
America and detained on board His ... Majesty's 
fleets, for whose discharge I made applications ... 
and to which answers were returned stating that, 
having no documents to prove their citizenship, 
the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty could 
not consent to their discharge.~ 
The Admiralty could not release a sailor who had no proof 
of citizenship simply on the basis that he claimed to be 
American. Not if they wanted to maintain any degree of 
consistency at all. 
William Marsden attempted to explain the matter to 
Lenox three days later: 
The admission of the principle that a man 
declaring himself to belong to a foreign State 
should, upon that assertation merely ... be suffered 
to leave the service, would be productive of the 
most dangerous consequences to His Majesty's navy. 36 
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Britain's dilemma is clear. Marsden was right that just 
saying you were American was hardly enough. Deserters were 
doing that already. 
in retrospect it was probably for the best that 
Britain kept her acquisitions. War broke out again in may, 
1803. By July American newspapers were full of reports of 
renewed impressments. The Philadelphia Aurora demanded 
Britain "should frankly and perfectly respect the 
neutrality of the United States. 1137 Boston's Independent 
Chronicle called for America "to take a stand, as it 
respects our neutral situation. " 38 And the Salem Register 
warned that British impressments could "arouse the 
indignation of the American people. " 39 If the papers were 
any judge, the American public was becoming fed up with the 
British practice. 
In May, 1803, Rufus King made his final attempt to 
halt high seas impressments. Admiral st. Vincent, First 
Lord of the Admiralty, even agreed to the terms of a 
convention, before quickly backing out. He excused himself 
to King by saying that he could not agree because the 
proposed ban on impressments covered the narrow seas [the 
English Channel and the Irish Sea] which Britain considered 
territorial waters. 4° King left England on May 21, 1803, 
defeated, though he later believed he might have been 
successful if he'd stayed in England longer. 41 
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Though the situation was rapidly growing worse 
President Jefferson's administration attempted to maintain 
calm. Jefferson announced in October that America's goal 
was "to cultivate the friendship of the belligerent 
nations. " 42 Public outrage made it hard for his 
administration to act cautiously. Jefferson decided to 
take as official U.S. policy the points King had managed to 
get unofficial agreement on. 
On the subject of our seamen, as both parties 
were agreed against impressments at sea, and 
concealments in port, I suppose we may practice 
on those two articles as things understood, 
alth'o no convention was signed. 43 
Aside from the fact that it is useless to try to force a 
country to adhere to unofficial agreements, the British had 
never agreed against impressments at sea. They merely 
stated that they were not deliberately impressing American 
citizens. 
In an attempt to prevent any incidents from developing 
Madison sent instructions to King's replacement, James 
Monroe in October. He insisted naval officers "abstain" 
from impressments.M Regrettably, Great Britain was in no 
position to stop the practice. Desertions rose in 
frequency yet again. In late November the House of Commons 
was busy discussing a "bill for preventing the desertion of 
guilty officers and seamen. "45 This bill passed on March 9, 
1804 and included a provision "for punishing mutiny and 
desertion" as well as one "for allowing vessels ... charting 
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out from any port in Great Britain to complete their full 
number of men at certain ports for the present. " 46 Since 
laws are generally not passed without a reason it seems 
safe to extrapolate that England was experiencing its fair 
share of desertions, was in need of sailors and was not too 
picky about where she got them. 
In August, Madison gave Monroe instructions for new 
talks on impressment. If Britain would agree that the 
United States flag gave protection to those traveling under 
it, America would promise unconditional surrender of all 
deserters. 47 But Madison was also told to wait. The 
Jefferson administration had placed itself in a cautious 
holding pattern until the arrival of the new British 
minister to America, Anthony Merry. 
CHAPTER IV 
ANTHONY MERRY AND JAMES MONROE 
In late November, 1803 Anthony Merry arrived to become 
British Minister to the United States. Secretary of State 
Madison lost no time opening talks on the subject of 
impressment. Lord Hawkesbury, Grenville's successor, gave 
Merry no advice on the topic, instead ordering him to be a 
general good will messenger. 
You will deliver to [the President] ... His 
Majesty's sincere anxiety to promote and improve 
the Harmony and good Understanding which so happily 
subsist between His Majesty's Government and that 
of the United States. 1 
Good advice, but unhelpful for the problems of the moment. 
During Merry's term as minister the issues of greatest 
concern were maritime, impressment one of the most 
important. From 1803 until the start of the War of 1812 
just over 6,000 Americans were pressed into British 
service. 2 Many Americans suspected the increase was meant 
to destroy America's growing merchant marine. 
(Congressman) Crowninshield said that ... he 
thought these impressments ought to be prevented ... 
His intention was to prevent the American carrying 
trade to the West Indies from falling into the 
hands of other nations. 3 
In turn some British suspected American politicians were 
enlarging the issue for the sake of domestic political 
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gains. As early as 1801, Edward Thornton, then British 
Minister at Washington, complained that despite peace 
between America and Britain desertion of seamen was 
encouraged in every United States port. He claimed this 
was a method used to keep British shipping out of American 
ports where it competed with United States shippingo 4 
Merry also distrusted American motives. 
Dr. Franklin Jameson once said Merry served as 
minister "in pompous unhappiness. 115 and it would seem to 
have been an accurate assessment. In his first dispatch to 
the Foreign Office Merry reported that Madison had spoken 
of impressments three times. He also stated that he 
thought the American government was using the issue to get 
"a greater respect" for the American flag so they could 
gain "a more convenient system of neutral Navigation" than 
Britain had previously agreed to. 6 
While Madison and Merry discussed impressment Congress 
did as well. On November 22 the Senate demanded "that the 
President ... cause to be laid before the Senate ... 
information ... relative to the ... impressment of any seamen 
in the service of the United States" since the renewal of 
the Anglo-French War in May. 7 On December 5, Madison 
reported that seventy men had been impressed, forty-three 
of whom were Americans. 8 The actual numbers were far 
higher but this news was not received until March, 1804. 9 
The numbers were apparently high enough already. On 
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December 12 the Senate appointed a committee to study the 
need for further protective measures for American sailors. 10 
On January 14 this committee introduced a bill to close 
American ports to men guilty of impressment and to outlaw 
the loading or landing of cargo to or from ships of the 
offending nation. 11 
Merry was sure this was due to hostile anti-British 
sentiments in Jefferson's administration. He reported: 
Instead of these Steps having been produced 
by any general Sensation of the People ... I ... fear 
they have been produced solely by the unfriendly 
Disposition of the executive whose influence was 
so great in Congress. 12 
Merry was surely mistaken. Jefferson had already made it 
abundantly clear in his personal correspondence that his 
government was dedicated to a cautious policy of restraint. 
In March, 1801 he wrote to Thomas Paine: 
Determined as we are to avoid ... wasting the 
energies of our people in war and destruction, 
we shall avoid implicating ourselves with the 
powers of Europe, even in support of principles 
which we mean to pursue ... we believe we can 
enforce those principles ... by peaceable means. 
This was a sentiment typical of Thomas Jefferson, a firm 
believer in the power of rational discourse. In October of 
the same year Jefferson again stressed his desire for peace 
in a letter to William Short. 
We have a perfect horror at everything like 
connecting ourselves with the politics of Europe .. e 
To be entangled with them would be a much greater 
evil than a temporary acquiescence in the false 
principles which have prevailed. Peace is our 
most important interest. 13 
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If the President had been anti-British he would hardly have 
waited for Merry to arrive before making even the smallest 
move on impressment. Jefferson may have even had a hand in 
stopping passage of the bill as it was his close friend, 
Senator William Carey Nicholas who made an official 
announcement in late February. 
"At no period of our government" had there existed 
"so cordial a friendship" between Great Britain 
and America. "Passage of the bill would disrupt 
the harmony" between them. " 14 
The Senate then postponed further discussion of the billa 
Merry, however, was oblivious to the troubles 
incessant reports of impressments might be giving Jefferson 
and Madison. He was only concerned with the escalating 
number of British deserters. The Phaeton, which brought 
him to New York, had itself lost fourteen men. 15 In April, 
1804 he reported that twelve British vessels had been 
delayed at Norfolk because of desertions. Many of the 
former British sailors had apparently joined an American 
squadron going to the Mediterranean. Though merry 
complained to him personally Madison said that since the 
sailors had enlisted voluntarily there was nothing he could 
do .t6 
By June, 1804 Britain was again desperate for sailorse 
The Secretary at War moved [in the House of 
Commons] for leave to bring in a bill to enable 
his Majesty to raise foreign corps, and indemnifying 
those who had taken foreigners into His Majesty's 
service . 17 
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For the first time Britain was contemplating accepting the 
services of foreign sailors, mercenaries. The act passed 
on July 14, "enabling Subjects of Foreign States to enlist 
as soldier's in His Majesty's Service. 1118 
Two months later a British merchant vessel, the Pitt, 
was boarded in New York harbor by a gang from the British 
ship Cambrian and fourteen British seamen were impressed. 
British consul Thomas Barclay was very much against such 
tactics as they violated American sovereignty. 19 Typically, 
he was ignored. 
Madison demanded the return of the men, an apology and 
the delivery of the officer responsible. Merry gave him 
nothing and referred everything to Lord Hawkesbury, who 
also did nothing.w On August 15, Merry finally washed his 
hands of the matter entirely. He decided that the British 
captain had acted within his rights since a French ship had 
done much the same thing in Boston harbor several months 
earlier with no United States reaction. 21 Madison called 
Merry "a mere Diplomatic pettifogger. " 22 But whether he was 
angry over Merry's accusation because it was true or false 
is difficult to ascertain. 
After September, 1804 the State Department bypassed 
Merry completely, sending its complaints to the British 
government through the American minister in London. 
Results were achieved in November when Lord Harrowby, the 
Foreign Secretary, wrote to Merry: 
His Majesty's Government have perceived .. ethe 
increasing Acrimony ... by the American Secretary 
of State on the Subject of the Impressment of 
Seamen from on board of American Ships ..• strictest 
Orders will be given without delay to the 
Commanders of His Majesty's Ships ... to abstain 
from Impressments in the Ports of the United 
States.n 
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From now on Americans would only be impressed at sea. The 
British government's previous lack of response was due, in 
part, to other distractions. James Monroe had seen in 
April, 1804, that the Addington ministry would not survive 
attacks by Pitt on their running of the war. "While the 
late ministry was on the decline it seemed useless to press 
it on any concern of ours. 1124 In May Monroe's prediction 
came true and Pitt resumed control. Up until this point 
the situation had been as such: If a seized American could 
prove his birth Madison would send the documents to Monroe 
who sent them to the British Admiralty who ordered an 
enquiry. If by then the man wasn't dead from battle or 
disease or accident he would probably be released, after a 
year or two. 25 Naturally this system was a pain to both the 
Admiralty and Monroe and probably accounted for Monroe's 
desire to see an end to the trouble. 
In early June, Monroe approached the Earl of Harrowby 
about impressment. The new Foreign Secretary said he 
wasn't ready to act on it "nor did he know that he should 
be during the session of Parliament. 1126 The matter lay 
until August 4. On meeting with Harrowby to discuss Jay's 
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Treaty, Monroe once more took the opportunity to discuss 
impressments. Harrowby claimed he had no desire "to 
encourage the expectation that there could be an agreement, 
nor entirely to preclude it." Monroe left, understandably 
less than enthused, concluding that the Foreign Secretary 
"did not wish to encourage the expectation that we should 
agree in any arrangement on this head. 1127 
Finally, on September 1, after yet another meeting, 
Harrowby agreed to place the matter before the Cabinet. 28 
They wasted no time. By September 20, Sir William Scott 
from the High Court of the Admiralty, had informed Harrowby 
the American plan to stop high seas impressment was "unfit 
to be adapted. 1129 Monroe left for Spain and the talks were 
suspended by "mutual consent. 1130 
Meanwhile, in late 1804, Madison had again responded 
to a demand from the House of Representatives "that the 
Secretary of State ... lay before this House a return of the 
number of ... seamen who have been impressed. " 31 The new 
numbers were now based on complete data and showed that 
over 1,500 sailors had applied for release from wrongful 
impressment. This came as something of a shock. One 
Congressman commented: 
The list ... exceeded in number anything he had 
expected. He thought ... that the subject demanded 
investigation ... Will the United States tamely 
submit to see some of its best citizens torn 
from their families and friends ... Shall we see 
another country pursuing measures hostile to our 
commercial rights and make no effort to correct 
the mischief?32 
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The answer was a resounding 'no'. Talks were resumed with 
Merry. 33 
Also, an Act for the more effectual preservation of 
peace in the ports and harbors of the United States and the 
waters under their jurisdiction, passed on March 3, 1850. 
This contained a clause much like the act that Jefferson's 
friend, Senator Nicholas, had struck down: 
Whenever any officer of an armed vessel 
commissioned by any foreign power, shall on the 
high seas, commit any trespass ... on board any 
vessel of the United States ... it shall be lawful ... 
to interdict the entrance of the said officer ... 
within the limits of the United states.~ 
This was the first real retaliation from America and could 
have been quite a problem as British war ships were 
stationed in the Indies and Canada and often travelled 
through United States waters. In response, British 
officials again charged America with giving deserters false 
American citizenship papers. Madison replied that they 
were making "a very ... unwarranted assertion." This did not 
stop Merry from attempting to get Madison to admit that 
illegal certificates were often issued. 35 Madison would, of 
course, admit nothing. After these exchanges, in April, 
1805, Merry was never to receive another complaint about a 
specific instance of impressment. One reason for the 
United States government to keep the lid on was economic. 
If America went to war she would lose her neutral nation 
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freight carrying status and thus lose her merchant marinee 
The merchant fleet and the money it brought in had been one 
of the carrots angled before the American public during the 
revolution. Because of the importance attached to 
commercial well-being there was little desire to rock the 
boat where it was concerned. Then, in June, Pitt decided 
to obstruct American neutral trade. 36 
On June 25, the Duke of Montrose spoke in the House of 
Lords: 
According to the navigation act there could be 
no communication between the United States and 
the British West India islands except in British 
bottoms. But a power was given to the governor 
of every island to allow the importation of 
provisions ... in case of necessity. It having 
appeared, however, that some irregularities had 
arisen in the exercise of this power and that 
a too general importation had been permitted, 
directions were sent out to the governors not 
to make too frequent use of the discretion.n 
Now Britain was hitting America where it lived, in the 
purse strings. Negative response was only a matter of 
time. 
At around the same time James Monroe returned to 
London and called on the new Foreign Secretary, the Earl of 
Mulgrave, to talk once more about impressment. 38 But things 
had changed. The government and the navy now belonged to 
Pitt. Addington men were firmly on the outside. 
Complaints had even been heard in Parliament: 
Earl Darnley rose and expressed his regret .. o 
[that) the persons who had the superintendence 
of the naval department ... seemed to have come 
into office upon the specific pledge of wholly 
reversing the system of their predecessors. 39 
Certainly this was a bit of party rhetoric, but it aptly 
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described Pitt's new view towards the carrying trade in the 
West Indies. 
Monroe waited for three weeks after his meeting with 
Mulgrave with no response. At last he decided to pressure 
the secretary by announcing his imminent return to 
America. 40 This got Mulgrave's attention. He wrote Prime 
Minister Pitt on October 12: 
Mr. Monroe's notice of his leave ... is sudden 
and unexpected, some answer good or bad ... must 
be given to Him ... it would have an awkward 
appearance ... if he were suffered to depart Home 
without any answer from this Government. 41 
Mulgrave sent Monroe a note in late November which, 
according to Monroe, "revived the expectation" that he 
might see some action. Unfortunately, Mulgrave was only 
concerned with the Pitt ministry's image. As soon as 
Monroe told Mulgrave that he'd decided to stay, the cabinet 
immediately put off any decision on the subject. 42 
For four years Jefferson and Madison had consistently 
pursued a course of peaceful diplomacy. They had worked to 
keep the responses of their country and its government both 
calm and rational. Now, whether they liked it or not, that 
was all to change. With no talks in sight and the West 
Indies profit gone Americans began to call for serious 
action, even war. 
CHAPTER V 
THE TREATY OF 1806 
Soon after Congress opened in December of 1805, 
British charge Anthony Merry wrote of a tendency they had 
to "combine the recent Detentions of American Ships with 
the Impressment of American seamen." In this way, he 
concluded, Congress hoped "to excite universal Resentment 
against us. " 1 He was absolutely correct.. The Ninth 
Congress marked the end of a moderate American attitude 
towards impressment. The issue had been allowed to drag on 
for too long and was now beginning to demand resolutione 
Secretary of State Madison saw the solution in new 
negotiation and the administration formulated a strategy of 
economic coercion to push through its diplomatic agenda. 
Madison advised Jefferson, 
If a commercial weapon can be properly shaped 
for the Executive hand, it is more and more 
apparent to me that it can force all the nations 
having colonies in this quarter of the globe to 
respect our rights. 2 
Madison's thoughts seemed aimed at an export embargo for 
the West Indies designed to coerce England into relaxing 
her regulations. 3 Within two months Monroe advised the 
same·course of action. 
We shall get nothing from any but by force, 
but ... with a subtle pressure, which however must 
be unequivocal and decisive ... we may succeed in 
what is right with any of them. "4 
This was an even stronger sentiment than Madison's and it 
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came from the man who was in almost all respects America's 
ambassador to England. 
Jefferson took the advice to heart. In his message at 
the opening of Congress he stated that: 
the authority of reason ... imposes on us the 
obligation of providing an effectual and 
determined opposition to a doctrine so 
injurious to the rights of peaceable nations."5 
The American government, even at the highest level, felt a 
need, almost a compulsion, for action in the face of the 
long standing difficulties with impressment. These were 
stronger words than had ever before been put to the 
subject. After the message had been read, Senator William 
Plumer commented, "The message is more energetic and 
warlike than any he (Jefferson] ever sent to Congress."6 
So it was readily apparent that the usually pacifist 
Jefferson administration was rapidly reaching the end of 
its rope. 
The Jefferson administration was taking a tougher 
approach. Their plan called for sending Congress a special 
anti-British message. To be included was an October 15 
1805 despatch from Monroe which contained a strong call for 
coercive measures. He warned that Britain intended "to 
push their fortune in every practicable line at our 
expense." Recent seizures of men and ships were simply 
experiments to see how far Britain could push America 
without retaliation. 
If it succeeds, they will ... pursue the 
advantage gained to the greatest extent in 
all the relations susisting between the two 
countries, more especially in the empressment 
of our seamen. 
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Monroe recommended immediate pressure be placed on Britain 
as her "colonies are dependent on us."7 Only in this 
manner, it was felt, could Britain's depredations be 
stopped. 
The message was planned for the second week of 
January, 1806 but was delayed for several days. 8 The 
reason appears to have been cold feet since Jefferson's 
portion of the communique was considerably toned down by 
the time of its release on the 17th. Now, on impressment, 
Jefferson would only say that U.S. "remonstrances had never 
been intermitted."9 This amounted to a statement that 
though nothing had ever been done about impressment at 
least America had never stopped complaining about it. 
This was not a very strong message to send, 
particularly considering the administration wanted to 
persuade Congress to take decisive action. It seems 
probable that Jefferson felt Monroe's dispatch was bad 
enough, and that Congress didn't need him to breathe fire 
and brimstone as well. Senator James Logan described the 
dispatch as containing "a spirit of war and blood. " 10 and 
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John Quincy Adams felt it was "full of bitterness against 
England, and urging strong and decisive measures. " 11 Which 
indeed it was. Adams later stated that, "Mr. Monroe was 
known not to be friendly to England. " 12 Which would seem to 
qualify as a vast understatement. It would appear then, 
that Jefferson was right to tone down his portion of the 
missive lest Congress come up with more serious action than 
he had planned for. If this was the case then Jefferson 
needed to tone his message down even more. 
Representative Andrew Gregg of Pennsylvania surprised 
the House with a resolution calling for total 
non-importation of "goods, wares or merchandise, or the 
growth, product or manufacture" 13 of Great Britain or her 
colonies. The next day, Samuel Smith submitted a 
resolution proposing selective non-importation. 14 These two 
sides quickly became the focus of intense discussion in the 
Senate. Uriah Tracy of Connecticut was "decidedly" against 
non-importation as were George Logan and Abraham Baldwin of 
Georgia. These representatives of the eastern states 
feared non-importation would hurt America as much as 
Britain. John Quincy Adams, generally on the side of the 
administration, agreed. Joseph Anderson of Tennessee 
finally proposed to modify the resolution. Adams drafted a 
plan which now called for the President to send an envoy 
extraordinary to London. 15 
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The Senate called on the President "to demand and 
insist upon" compensation for seizures "particularly 
respecting the impressment of American seamen." This 
course of action was approved by the Senate February 5, 
1806.16 
Meanwhile, several more plans were brought up in the 
House. Joseph Clay of Pennsylvania proposed a "mild but 
firm" ban "likely to induce Great Britain, in particular, 
to recede from the unjust pretension she has set up. " 17 Any 
country who refused to allow United States vessels into its 
colonial ports would likewise be stopped from entering 
American ports. Jacob Crowninshield added a plan calling 
or an embargo on all trade with Britain. He explained: 
We are merely about to prohibit the importation 
of British goods in consequence of her having 
seized our vessels ... and in consequence of her 
seizure of American citizens protected by the 
American flag . 18 
He was not alone in calling for strong measures. James 
Sloan of New Jersey also called for an embargo until 
Britain agreed to "equitable arrangement" 19 on impressment 
and seizures. 
None of these plans received serious consideratione 
Instead, attention went to Joseph Nicholson's diplomatic 
proposal of partial non-importation: 
By laying a prohibition on the importation 
of all articles received from Great Britain ... we 
shall be laughed at ... for adopting a system 
altogether impractical because we cannot adhere 
to it.w 
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Instead, his plan called for continuing the import of cheap 
woolens, rum, salt and hardwares in an effort to cushion 
the economic blow to American merchants. The debate on 
commercial restrictions quickly became one between Gregg's 
total non-importation and Nicholson's partial plane 
Madison and Jefferson were both in favor of limited 
non-importation though they only spoke their views in 
private. John Quincy Adams reported on February 13, 1806: 
(Madison's] system of proceeding towards Great 
Britain is ... a retaliating navigation act; and 
aggravated duties on articles imported from here 
This is doubtless the President's favorite 
policy. 21 
Two weeks later he confirmed his assumption, writing, "I 
dined at the President's ... His own preference is manifestly 
for Nicholson's resolution. " 22 Jefferson and Madison were 
unwilling to interfere directly in the day to day workings 
of Congress, believing as strongly as they did in the 
separation of the executive branch from the judicial and 
the legislative. Their usual method was to work through 
favorably disposed allies in both houses. 
Now, hoping to calm Congress, Jefferson sent a note 
from Lord Mulgrave promising that the "American question" 
would soon be settled.n It turned out to be an empty 
promise. After a month went by with no further word from 
Mulgrave, the administration finally sent a report on 
imports and exports demanded by Congressman Randolph before 
the House would consider Gregg's proposal. This was 
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typical of the Jefferson-Madison approach. Neither man had 
any real desire for war, or even to be much of a 
hard-liner. When they saw that a direct approach had 
worked, as in securing the statement from Mulgrave, they 
were often too quick to take the pressure off. Then, when 
the lessening in pressure caused results to drop off, they 
would turn the heat up again. 
On March 8, Madison sent the House a report on 
impressments requested over two months before. Three days 
later he wrote Monroe that he and the President were still 
"waiting with solicitude"24 for the British cabinet's 
promised reply. Their patience was wearing thin. 
Jefferson clearly felt it was time for some action. 
The love of peace which we sincerely feel and 
profess," he wrote on March 18, "has begun to 
produce an opinion in Europe that our government 
is entirely in Quaker principles ... This opinion 
must be corrected when just occasion arises, 
or we shall become the plunder of all nations. 25 
It must be stressed that Jefferson said this in private, 
apparently trusting that he had already goaded Congress 
enough, if not too much. 
Debate on Gregg's resolution ran from March 5 to March 
13. It soon became apparent only a minority supported full 
nonimportation. Gregg's proposal was defeated 70 to 47o 26 
The House then spent four days debating Nicholson's plan 
which passed on March 18 with a resounding 87 to 35 voteo 27 
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This bill then passed the Senate on April 15 and Jefferson 
signed it into law three days later e 28 
Congressional debate confirmed Phineas Bond's 
observation of the tendency to merge the anti-British 
complaints of seizures of American ships and impressment. 
Gregg had placed impressment first among a long list of 
grievances in his resolution. Barnabas Bidwell noted in a 
discussion on seizures that impressments were occurring at 
a far greater rate than ever before.~ Some extreme 
Republicans even said they now accepted the possibility of 
war with Great Britain as the only means of solving 
America's problem, though they generally denied it would 
have to go that far. Instead, the resolve for war on 
America's part would be sufficient to deter Great Britain. 30 
Critics thought the uproar over impressments was 
excessive and somewhat hollow. Joseph Nicholson felt it 
was "the carrying trade alone" that was responsible for 
national outrage. 
It was a matter of little surprise, that 
gentlemen had so long slept upon a subject 
[impressment], on which they now appeared to 
manifest so much zeal ... Strong measures were 
not then the order of the day, nor would they 
be now, if the impressment of American seamen 
was the only ground of complaint. 31 
The crusade against impressment was, to him, a hoax. Rufus 
King was also against the extreme measures being taken 
against impressment. He felt the non-importation act was 
designed to batter Britain into concessions. King wrote 
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Sir Francis Baring, a London banker, that the act "must 
not ... occasion temper on the side of England. The two 
countries should be friends, and a captious temper should 
not ... prevent them being so.''n His use of the word 
'captious' indicates that he too felt American anger to be 
something of a sham. 
Perhaps it is true that some men used the populist 
issue of impressment to further their desires for 
unrestricted trade with the British West Indies. However, 
the argument could also be made that men used the hard 
economic issue of the carrying trade to force the 
government to pay attention to their concerns about 
impressment. I believe Nicholson and King were wronge At 
this point many Americans seemed to feel affairs were at a 
critical state. Like Jefferson they believed acquiescence 
was out of the question. This is not to suggest that 
Americans hungered for war. At this point the course most 
favored was negotiation backed with commercial sanctionso 33 
To start the negotiations, Jefferson decided to send 
an envoy extraordinary to London. William Pinckney agreed 
to take the job on March 13.~ The decision to send the 
envoy was probably due to the arrival of some promising 
news. The Jefferson administration had learned of Prime 
Minister Pitt's death and the new Grenville-Fox 
administration in early February. Monroe wrote Madison 
that "the arrangement of the new Ministry was 
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completed ... in the course of the last week. It makes ... a 
thorough change of character ... at least in respect to us. 1135 
This news, coupled with the action in Congress could hardly 
have helped but spark excitement. Indeed, Jefferson wrote 
in June: 
Every communication from Mr. Monroe strengthens 
our expectation that the new pretence of the 
British to control our commerce with belligerents' 
colonies will be properly restricted, and the 
outrages on our seamen brought to an end. 36 
However, neither Jefferson, Madison or Monroe ever thought 
all obstacles to a settlement had been removed. This 
change in ministry was simply a favorable component. 
By mid-1806 the re-export trade and impressment were 
of paramount importance. Madison wrote to Monroe and 
Pinckney: 
The importance of an effectual remedy for (the 
impressment of American sailors], derives urgency 
from the licentiousness with which it is still 
pursued, and from the growing impatience of this 
country under it. 
This plainly illustrates why the Jefferson administration 
was hedging their bets, even though the Grenville-Fox 
ministry was friendly to the United States. Impressment 
was still occurring, and often. Madison continued: 
So indispensable is some adequate provision 
for [impressment], that the President makes 
it a necessary preliminary to any stipulation 
requiring a repeal of the Act shutting the 
market of the U. States against certain British 
manufactures.n 
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This was not political opportunism, but a genuine 
reflection of the strength of feeling excited by 
impressment in this country. Judge John Tyler wrote to 
Jefferson, "I would rather not exist as a man or nation 
than to suffer such violations of the rights and liberty of 
our fellow citizens. 1138 A week later Wilson Cary Nicholas 
advised that, "the impressment of our seamen is a thing 
that the honor, the feelings and the interest of the United 
States calls aloud upon the government to put an end to .. " 39 
Clearly there was a great deal of anger on the subject 
which Jefferson would have been ill-advised to ignore. 
Britain's new government did want good relations with 
America, but not at the expense of vital British interestso 
After Monroe re-opened discussions on impressment on 
February 25, the new Admiralty board responded with a very 
old argument. The American proposal "would, if adopted, be 
attended with the most pernicious, if not fatal 
consequences to His Majesty's naval Service. 1140 This had 
been the Royal Navy's response for years. As always, the 
need for impressment reflected a shortage of sailors. The 
navy had continued to expand throughout 1806. In January 
of 1806 Britain possessed 590 ships and 111,237 sailors. 
By January of 1807 the navy consisted of 650 ships and 
119,855 sailors. 41 Thus, though the number of sailors had 
risen, the per capita number of sailors per ship had 
dropped. With France attempting to take over all of 
Europe, Britain needed every sailor she could grab. 
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To compound problems, Fox fell fatally ill three days 
after Pinckney arrived in London. Lord Auckland, an ally 
of Lord Grenville's with long diplomatic experience, was 
chosen to take Fox's place in negotiation with the 
Americans. 42 This was not necessarily good news. Jefferson 
was afraid Auckland was "too much wedded to the antient 
maritime code and principles of England.''~ This because of 
the Lord's long-time service in the diplomatic arena. 
Auckland seemed to bear this opinion out, when, at his 
introductory dinner, he declared, "I trust we shall be able 
to do some good to mankind, if your powers are sufficiently 
extensive."" Which was not exactly extending the olive 
branch. 
However, to the Americans there still remained a ray 
of hope. Also assigned was Henry Vassal Holland, Fox's 
nephew. Early in 1806, Monroe had reported that Holland 
had written a pamphlet expressing "very liberal sentiments 
toward the United States.''~ The Jefferson administration 
hoped that Holland would extend a mitigating influence on 
Auckland whom they expected to be intractable. 
With the new British team settled negotiation began 
again on September first. As talks commenced it became 
clear that the British would be hewing closer to Auckland's 
point of view than Holland's. Still, there was a sign of 
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compromise. The British negotiators referred to 
impressment as "extremely delicate and embarrassing." They 
requested to know "precisely" what the United States would 
put in a treaty to guarantee the restoration of British 
sailors. It was their fear that the American plan would 
turn United States merchant ships into "receptacles for 
deserters." They themselves "felt the strongest 
repugnance" to a renunciation of the right to impress "such 
seamen as should appear to be their own subjects." They 
suggested instead that America issue "authentic documents 
of citizenship" whose form would be settled by treaty" and 
would "completely protect those to whom they related. " 46 
Though this was a significant concession the talks soon 
stalled. The Americans, always leery of this sort of 
paperwork, found "that it was besides impossible that we 
should acknowledge in favor of any foreign power ... such 
jurisdiction on board our vessels ... as this sort of 
impressment implied. " 47 Monroe and Pinckney seemed to fear 
that the British negotiators were trying to catch them in a 
game of 'slip-up'. A mistaken word could then lead to 
Britain claiming that America had acknowledged Britain's 
basic right to impress sailors. 
Meanwhile, Auckland had received alleged examples of 
fraudulent American protections from the Admiralty. He 
showed these documents to the Americans and "insisted much 
on the difficulty which this notorious Practice would raise 
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in framing any Article for the due security ... of the 
British Navy." It was a legitimate concern, yet, despite 
their apparent reservations, Auckland and Holland set out 
the American plan for the cabinet's consideration. They 
did, however, recommend that "whatever arrangements may be 
thought advisable or expedient on this Subject" be 
temporary "so that its defects may eventually be 
reconsidered and rectified. " 48 After this advice, a sort of 
diplomatic buckling of safety belts, the British 
negotiators told Monroe and Pinckney "that the several 
considerations had been sufficiently discussed, to be laid 
immediately before the King's Ministers for further 
instructions. " 49 The four men agreed to adjourn until 
November fifth. 
When the cabinet finally sat to discuss the proposal 
it was November fourth. They agreed only that if any 
article was to be adopted the right to impressment itself 
had to be preserved "in Status Quo by express Saving 
Provisos. " 50 In other words, no deal. 
Though initially rejecting Britain's 'counter 
proposal', Monroe and Pinckney gave in to British requests 
to continue negotiations. Auckland drafted a note to the 
Americans immediately, promising: 
that instructions have been given and shall 
be repeated and enforced; for the observance 
of the greatest caution in the impressing of 
British seamen; and that the strictest care 
shall be taken to preserve the citizens of the 
United States from any molestation or injury; 
and that immediate and prompt redress shall be 
afforded upon any representation of injury 
sustained by them. 51 
Which did nothing to solve the problem but was certainly 
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very polite. In fact, the British had been being polite in 
this manner for some years already, so this assurance 
really meant nothing. 
A full treaty was finally signed by the American team 
on New Year's Eve, however, there was a formal silence on 
impressment.~ On February 3, Madison wrote the 
negotiators: 
If no satisfactory or formal stipulation on 
the subject of impressment be obtainable the 
negotiation should be made to terminate without 
any formal compact whatever, but with mutual 
understanding, founded on friendly and liberal 
discussions and explanations, that in practice 
each party will entirely conform to what may 
be thus informally settled. 53 
At this time, of course, he had no knowledge of the already 
signed treaty. Still, from his words we find his reaction 
on March 3, when the treaty did arrive, unsurprising. When 
Madison saw it contained nothing on impressment he said 
that "he did not think it would be possible to ratify the 
Treaty, without an Article that should satisfactorily 
provide for the Object. " 54 That 'object' was, naturally, 
the end of impressment. 
Jefferson rejected the treaty as well.H This 
rejection marked the end of friendly Anglo-American 
relations for years to come. The next phase began a slow 
downward spiral that led finally to war. 
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CHAPTER VI 
THE CHESAPEAKE-LEOPARD ENCOUNTER 
Administration leaders spent the Spring of 1807 trying 
to think of a way to get Britain to make concessions on 
impressment. On March 17, Madison urged a plan to renounce 
the use of British sailors in the American carrying trade. 1 
Albert Gallatin, the Secretary of the Treasury, began to 
examine the possible impact of this renunciation. He found 
that at least 9,000 of the 69,000 sailors in the United 
States navy and merchant marine were British. Gallatin 
warned that Madison's proposal could "materially injure" 
American commerce and navigation "much more" than "any 
restrictions" the British government could lay "supposing 
no treaty to take place." The sacrifice would be "too 
great for the object." He would only recommend Madison's 
plan if a failure to procure a treaty would "lead to 
hostilities, or to a state of things equivalent thereto. 112 
Again, the primary consideration was commerce. The only 
thing that could hurt trade more than impressment was the 
loss of 9,000 British sailors and the only thing worse than 
that was out and out war. 
Madison was forced to agree that Gallatin's numbers 
had to "command just attention." He proposed instead to 
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renounce the services of all British sailors except those 
with more than two years outside their own country's 
services. He wrote to Jefferson that General Henry 
Dearborn, the Secretary of War, and Robert Smith, the 
Secretary of the Navy, were, "willing to go to great 
lengths on this subject. The case of impressment 
is ... urgent. Something seems essential to be done, nor is 
anything likely to be done without carrying fresh matter 
into the negotiation."3 Unfortunately this came on the 
heels of Gallatin's statement. The Jefferson 
administration was no longer ready to take what seemed 
drastic action. Jefferson replied, "On the subject of the 
British treaty ... the more it is developed the worse it 
appears."4 The President felt the number of British 
sailors in American employ made it: 
prudent ... to drop the idea of any proposition 
not to employ them. The best course is to let 
the negotiation take a friendly nap and endeavor 
in the meantime to practice on such of its 
principles as are mutually acceptable. 5 
America, it seemed, could not afford to renounce British 
sailors any more than Britain could renounce impressment. 
Madison, at this point, began to "suspect" that the treaty 
would have to be limited to the "subject of Impressments, 
leaving the Colonial Trade with other objects to their own 
course." He continued to push his views, however, 
recommending "fresh concessions" be made. 6 
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The advice was not followed. The administration as 
angered by the human tragedy of impressment but they were 
not ready to destroy American commerce over it. In the 
instructions to Monroe and Pinckney finished on May 20, 
only the proposal to prohibit employment of those with less 
than two years service survived. This was now to be 
offered only "in the event of a rejection of every 
arrangement already authorized." If Britain rejected this 
final offer, Monroe and Pinckney were to refer the problem 
back to Washington. However, it was hoped that talks could 
be made as long as possible. As Madison said, 
As long as negotiation can be honorably 
protracted, it is a resource to be preferred, 
under existing circumstances, to the preemptory 
alternative of improper concessions or inevitable 
collisions. 
The feeling seemed to be that as long as the two countries 
were talking they at least weren't at war. At the same 
time, Madison refused to aid the British in recovering 
their deserters from American ships. He claimed America 
and Britain had no treaty requiring restitution of 
deserters. 7 This stance was used as a carrot on a stick to 
help Madison reach his goal of a combined treaty to end 
impressment at sea and recover British deserters. 
Britain, of course, was not disposed to drop 
impressment, and Madison's proposals fell, not 
surprisingly, on deaf ears. All this work with so little 
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progress helped to create a tense atmosphere and eventually 
led to the attack on the Chesapeake. 
In December, 1806, British minister David Erskine went 
to Madison about the case of several deserters from a 
British ship who were being sheltered in Bostono Madison 
refused to help, saying again that: 
as no existing article of the Treaty between 
Great Britain and the United States [Jay's 
Treaty] gave any authority to the Government 
of the United States to exercise such a power, 
they did not dare interfere. 8 
Clearly, he was still hoping to attach this issue to that 
of impressment. On February 1, 1807, Madison tried again 
to tempt Erskine, telling him that a formal treaty would 
produce a situation where "every Facility would be afforded 
by the Government and the People" for the recovery of 
British deserters. He claimed "a great many would be 
restored."9 Of course nothing was done and the whole 
situation sat on pins and needles, an accident waiting to 
happen. 
In early January five sailors had fled from the H.M.S. 
Melampus, anchored near Hampton, Virginia. 10 Thomas Hall 
Parker, Mayor of Norfolk, refused to deliver the men since 
neither federal nor state law had provisions for such 
cases. 11 Secretary of the Navy, Robert Smith, listed the 
deserters who were now alleged to be on t he Chesapeake and 
ordered recruiting officers "in no case to enter deserters 
from British ships of war." Commodore James Barron, 
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captain of the Chesapeake, replied that three of the 
deserters were on his ship but were undoubtedly Americans 
pressed into the Royal Navy . 12 British naval officers soon 
put together their own theory of American behavior. 
Captain J.E. Douglas wrote on April 15 saying refusal to 
ratify the Treaty of 1806 was 
only a Finesse on their part, to prevent His 
Majesty's Ministers applying for the many 
Thousand British Subjects employed in the 
Navigation of the Vessels of the United 
States." 13 
That this was untrue is obvious but it is an illustration 
of the anger and frustration felt within the British navy 
over American conduct. 
Admiral George Berkeley, in command of the British 
ships on the North American station, reported to the 
Admiralty that "the open and avowed protection" given to 
British deserters necessitated "some explanation from the 
American government." British officers who tried to get 
their men back were often subject to "the most glaring 
insults" from the local populace. 14 Clearly, Admiral 
Berkeley was reaching his limit. On May 31, he discovered 
that one of his ships, the Driver, had been expelled from 
Charlestown under threat of attack. It was the last straw. 
The next day Berkeley ordered his commanders to search for 
the British deserters known to be on the Chesapeake. 15 
Captain Douglas, anchored within sight of the 
Chesapeake assigned the search to the Leopard, a ship 
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nearly equal to the Chesapeake. He had a much larger ship 
at his call, the Bellona, and had it searched the 
Chesapeake an honor-bound American resistance might have 
been averted. Such was not to be the case. 
Late in the afternoon of June 22, the Leopard 
intercepted the Chesapeake and asked permission to send 
over a boat carrying dispatches. This was not unusual and 
the request was granted. When the boat arrived, however, 
the British lieutenant in charge gave Commodore Barron a 
note from the Captain of the Leopard along with a copy of 
Berkeley's orders and then demanded the British deserters. 
Barron refused and before the Chesapeake's decks could be 
cleared for action the Leopard had fired a warning shot and 
then a broadside into the frigate. After fifteen minutes 
of fire from the Leopard, the Chesapeake surrendered and 
the British boarding party returned and took four suspected 
deserters. 16 
The sight of the damaged frigate and news of three 
dead and eighteen wounded among her crew set off a violent 
chain reaction along the East coast. In Norfolk a crowd 
rioted and destroyed water casks from two of the British 
ships in Chesapeake Bay. 17 New Yorkers attackers and 
heavily damaged a British ship. Editor Thomas Ritchie of 
the Richmond Enquirer called upon the President to convene 
Congress to decide on the issue of war. 18 War was 
definitely an option and the fear was that the American 
public rather than the America government would make the 
decision. Jefferson advised restraint in the vicinity of 
Norfolk so that any decision could be left to Congress. 19 
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Three days later the cabinet banned all British warships 
from American waters and sent the aptly named Revenge to 
England to demand a disavowal of the attack, restoration of 
the men and the recall of Admiral Berkeley.w 
Public response in America was mostly anger. At a 
public meeting in Baltimore, Senator Samuel Smith called 
for "War-in case ... satisfaction is not given."21 though this 
sounded as if the Senator was standing tall, the reality 
was that satisfaction was almost certainly forthcoming. 
Still, from the reactions of many Americans, this seems to 
be a fact many people were not sure of. Jefferson's 
friend, Wilson Cary Nicholas said he was ready to 
"encounter war" since there was "no spirit which ought to 
be cherished with so much care by those who govern a young 
country as national pride and a regard to national honor .. " 22 
And Congressman James G. Jackson of West Virginia feared 
that "tame submission to such outrages" would "disgrace the 
Government and its Friends" paving the way for despotism .. 
It began to look as if Jefferson were suffering a crisis of 
decision, or even worse, was afraid to take action. This 
was not the case. Throughout July the president reminded 
his correspondents that the common usage of nations 
required America to give Britain a chance to make 
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reparations. Besides, American merchant and war ships 
would be left vulnerable if war were so suddenly declared. 24 
For all Jefferson's words the tension continued. 
After the destruction of the water casks, on July 8, 
British Captain Douglas blockaded Chesapeake Bay. 25 It was 
a dangerous move. Jefferson advised the Secretary of War 
that "the British commanders have their foot on the 
threshold of war. " 26 It seemed that there might indeed be a 
conflict. The crisis only began to abate on July 11 when 
Jefferson learned that the attack on the Chesapeake was not 
the result of prior orders from London. still, it was not 
until the fifteenth, when Douglas calmed down and dropped 
the blockade, that the danger of war passed.n 
At this point American demands for redress for the 
attack on the Chesapeake changed. The recall of Admiral 
Berkeley was dropped. Now the administration demanded 
"security for the future" to be achieved through "an entire 
abolition of impressments from vessels under the flag of 
the United States." This was hoped to be made possible 
"without the authorized rejection from the service of the 
United States of British seamen who have not been two years 
in it. 1128 This would appear to be a case of America feeling 
they were one-up on England and now in a position to press 
their demands while making no corresponding concessions of 
their own. 
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Meanwhile, public sentiment began to drift away from 
war. Albert Gallatin wrote Madison that New Yorkers "do 
not appear to me to be in favor of war." By this time, 
though, the immediate danger of war had passed. Canning 
wrote Monroe on July 25, assuring him that the British 
Government would give "the most prompt and effectual 
Reparation" if the British government was found to be the 
aggressor. The Foreign Secretary also said, however, that 
he was "not at present enabled to communicate" any 
particulars. 30 Monroe, at this point, knew absolutely 
nothing of the Chesapeake incident and wouldn't hear from 
the United States government for over a month. Though he 
had to be somewhat mystified he thanked Canning for the 
assurance that "this unfortunate occurrence was not 
authorized by his majesty's government. 1131 
Two days later, Monroe learned of the attack from news 
accounts. On July 29 he met with Canning and brought up 
the attack on the Chesapeake. He asked the cabinet to 
admit the incident was "a flagrant abuse" of authority and 
to give Washington "a frank disavowal of the principle on 
which it was made. 1132 Which meant give up impressment .. 
Unfortunately for Monroe the cabinet wasn't as sure about 
the incident as he was. After all, America had twice 
refused to return identified deserters. It hardly seemed 
the sort of mishap designed to get Britain to renounce a 
practice they had been doggedly hanging on to for 
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centuries. Canning replied to Monroe on August 3, assuring 
him "that His Majesty neither does or has maintained ... a 
right to search ships of war ... for deserters ... If it shall 
appear that the (attack] rested on no other grounds" than a 
right to search foreign warships, the British government 
would have "no difficulty is disavowing that act. " 33 The 
wording here indicates the British government felt 
reasonably sure that there would be some sort of 
extenuating circumstances. 
The next month Canning decided to announce a Royal 
Proclamation which would repeat the renunciation of a right 
to search foreign warships, while announcing Britain's 
intention to continue impressment from merchant ships on 
the high seas.~ Canning had already spoken of the idea 
with Monroe in early September and had been told that the 
American envoy was forbidden to separate reparations for 
the Chesapeake from the demand to end high seas 
impressment. 35 Monroe followed this refusal by submitting a 
formal demand for reparations and for the end of 
impressment. Canning's proclamation had to be put on 
hold. 36 The British cabinet instead announced an intention 
to send a special minister to America to settle reparations 
on t he Chesapeake. This note was delivered to Monroe on 
September 23, in it Canning refused to handle the 
Chesapeake and impressment issues together. 37 This seemed 
very high-handed to the Americans. On October 19, Monroe 
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and Pinckney asked Canning if the proclamation with its 
insistence on separation of the Chesapeake from impressment 
was designed to "shut the door against negotiation and 
concession." Canning replied that it was merely intended 
to state the British position. At the same time he also 
made it clear that Britain would not retreat from the 
practice of impressment: 
He said ... that he ought not to leave us under 
the impression that there was any prospect that 
the Government of Great Britain could recede 
from its declared pretensions r~lative to 
searching on the high seas the merchant ships 
of neutral nations for British seamen. 38 
This left the Americans very little room to maneuver and 
when Canning formally terminated negotiations on October 22 
it came as little surprise. 
Jefferson now began to prepare for the possibility of 
war. He first ordered a line beyond which British ships 
would not be allowed to pass. He then used his annual 
message to Congress for a powerful attack on England. 
"With the other nations of Europe our harmony has been 
uninterrupted, and commerce and friendly intercourse have 
been maintained on their usual footing." Great Britain, 
however, threatened the "peace and prosperity" of the 
nation. Now America would have to "restrain wrong by 
resistance. 1140 These were by far the harshest words 
Jefferson had yet used, a virtual call for war. Yet on 
October 26, the National Intelligencer, a government 
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mouthpiece, offered a choice between war or "surer 
reparation through the medium of commercial regulation. " 41 
Clearly, if Jefferson had been contemplating war he had 
changed his mind. It is even possible that he never 
planned for war and was only trying to gain leverage at the 
bargaining table. 
On December 14, His Majesty's Royal Proclamation of 
October 17 reached America. It was not received favorably. 
On December 17, Jefferson drafted a recommendation that 
Congress put an embargo on all American shipping. 42 This 
recommendation was sent to the Senate the same night. 
The communications now made, showing the great 
and increasing dangers with which our vessels, 
our seamen and merchandise, are threatened on the 
high seas and elsewhere from the belligerent powers 
of Europe, and it being of the greatest importance 
to keep in safety these essential resources, I deem 
it my duty to recommend the subject to the 
consideration of Congress, who will doubtless 
preceive all the advantages which may be expected 
from an inhibition of the departure of our vessels 
from the ports of the United States.~ 
This was probably the strongest measure Jefferson could 
have taken without actually pushing for a declaration of 
war. Congress was in apparent agreement as they passed the 
Embargo Act in just four days. When Jefferson signed it 
into law he was admitting his policy of negotiation had 
failed. He had fallen back as his last resort on 
non-importation and embargo as the last peaceful means of 
supporting America's ongoing quest for concessions. 
CHAPTER VII 
IMPRESSMENT TAKES A BACK SEAT, 1807-1812 
Late in 1807 attention began to turn away from 
impressment towards British and French attacks on neutral 
commerce. President Jefferson noted, "The decrees and 
orders of the belligerent nations ... amounted nearly to a 
declaration that they would take our vessels wherever 
found." 1 Jefferson was referring to Britain's problematic 
Orders in Council, passed November 11, 1807. This order 
prohibited under pain of capture, trade with any part of 
the European continent under French control, which was most 
everything. Britain had passed the decree in response to 
similar measures, the Berlin and Milan Decrees, passed by 
Napoleon. It is easy to see that having entire ships 
seized was a problem that outweighed having a few members 
of the crew taken away. For the next three years 
impressment lacked major importance as a political issue, 
but the practice continued unabated. Requests for the 
' release of sailors are the only guide to the number of men 
taken. Four hundred and ninety-eight men were impressed in 
1807 while 514 were impressed in 1808. By 1810 the number 
had jumped to 1,047 and in the first nine months of 1812 
another 830 releases were requested. 2 
75 
Though United States diplomats sometimes broached the 
subject, their attitudes were changeable. Albert Gallatin 
told British special envoy George Henry Rose in March, 
1808, that "nothing of a real difficulty remained between 
the Two Countries but His Majesty's Orders in Council .. " 
Rose noted that Gallatin repeated this statement "dwelling 
upon the word 'nothing' with particular emphasis." 3 But in 
August, 1809, Gallatin wrote David Erskine that there was 
little chance of an Anglo-American treaty without an 
agreement on impressment. 4 This change in attitude may 
have been caused by the failure of British-American 
negotiations. Only days after the United States embargo 
had been passed, George Rose arrived to discuss reparations 
for the Chesapeake. The Jefferson administration 
immediately agreed to separate this issue from 
impressment. 5 
Though Rose's mission was in the end a failure it did 
cause this change in American policy. Madison's new 
instructions to William Pinckney told him, 
You are authorized ... in the event of a repeal 
of the British orders, and of satisfactory pledges 
for repairing the aggression on the Chesapeake, 
to enter into informal arrangements for abolishing 
impressments. 6 
This indicates a new order of priority, with impressment 
clearly taking the back seat to the Orders. 
The temptation is to blame collapse of negotiations on 
American intransigence, the stubborn insistence on linking 
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impressment to other diplomatic issues. In this case, 
however, the Royal Proclamation of October 17, 1807, seemed 
to bar further negotiation. Jefferson admitted, "A 
proclamation of that Government (Britain] ... seems to have 
shut the door on all negotiation with us. 117 David Erskine 
wrote to London the day after Jefferson signed the embargo 
act warning that the Proclamation had convinced the 
Jefferson administration that Britain was unwilling to make 
major concessions. 8 Not for the first time, the news fell 
on deaf ears. 
One reason for the administration's lessening of 
impressment's importance could have been the waning of 
public interest. Only occasionally after 1807 did outrage 
at impressments hit the papers. 9 Congress was like-minded, 
rarely discussing the issue, and generally favoring 
commercial sanctions as retaliation for the more important 
Orders in Council through November, 1811. 
Dislike had grown toward the embargo, however, and 
Congress turned to a less severe measure. Macon's Bill #2 
became law in May, 1810. Repeal by one of the belligerents 
of its commercial restrictions had to be followed in ninety 
days by repeal of its enemies' decrees or non-intercourse 
would be sustained against the continuing offender. 
Napoleon repealed the Berlin and Milan Decrees towards 
America on November 2, 1810. On that day the United States 
government told Pinckney to notify Britain that they had 
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ninety days to revoke the Orders in Council. Britain 
refused, denying the French Decrees had been truly repealed 
since they had only been relaxed towards America. Congress 
then legislated a new non-intercourse act with Great 
Britain to begin March 1, 1811. 10 
Even after this set back, President Madison still 
thought there was a good possibility of settling the issueo 
Lord Holland [is] Prime Minister ... a new 
parliament (is] to be called ... It is highly 
probable that some natural change in the general 
policy of the (British] Government in relation 
to this country ... will result." 11 
His Secretary of State, James Monroe, was also hopeful for 
peace claiming he would be "most happy indeed" if the 
divisive issues could be settled on "reasonable and 
satisfactory grounds. " 12 This new administration was still 
operating within the framework of Jefferson's previous 
policy. War was damaging to commerce and something to be 
avoided if at all possible. Congress, for the moment, 
agreed. In February, 1811, a vote on a resolution 
demanding an end to impressment and the revoking of the 
Orders in Council failed, gathering only 21 votes out of 
104. 13 Yet despite this apparent goodwill, the British were 
taking no chances. John P. Marier, the British charge 
d'affairs, wrote to Sir Herbert Sawyer, the new Commander 
of the North American Station in May, 1811: 
The subject of impressment has always been 
one by which the feeling of this nation has 
been kept alive in its animosity against Great 
Britain ... Were I to venture to give an opinion 
on the subject of impressment in general, it 
would be for ... its abandonment in practice ... 
because I am confident that no possible advantage 
which can accrue to the service ... can compensate 
for the evil which a constant state of irritation 
between the two nations must create. 14 
Hoping that an Admiral would agree with his opinion was 
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wishful thinking on Mr. Morier's part, however, in a short 
time his assessment was to prove correct. 
The new British minister to America, Augustus John 
Foster, arrived in Washington on June 30, 1811. From 
President Madison's earlier remarks on the new British 
cabinet it would seem hopes were riding high that new 
negotiations would prove fruitful. Indeed, Monroe began 
talks three days after Foster's arrival, but impressment 
was ignored in favor of the French Decrees and the Orders 
in Council. 15 Unfortunately, Foster had been instructed to 
give very little in the upcoming talks. 
Altho' it is the anxious desire of His Royal 
Highness ... to avoid a rupture with the United 
States of America ... It is also expedient that 
the American Govt. should be made sensible, of 
the great extent of the means, which this Country 
possess, of affecting the commerce and industry 
of the United States ... Without resorting to the 
extremity of war ... you will use your discretion 
in suggesting these considerations ... at the 
time ... which may appear most convenient and 
useful. 16 
Though he did not use these suggested threats, Foster did, 
on his own initiative, attempt to explain how the u.s& 
government had been duped by the French. He hoped that 
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through his efforts "the delusions attempted by the 
Government of France have now been made manifest and the 
perfidious plans of its ruler exposed." 17 These hopes were 
in vain. Monroe, unwilling to give an inch on the subject, 
attacked the British position point by point. Foster's 
only reply to this long and detailed rebuttal was to ask if 
the President would now "rest satisfied with the partial 
repeal of the Berlin and Milan Decrees? 1118 The flippant 
reply surely angered Monroe and Madison who were obviously 
quite satisfied with partial repeal as long as it was 
America's portion that was repealed. Madison concluded 
that Foster was "more disposed to play the diplomatist, 
than the conciliatory negotiator. 1119 The negotiations, 
which America had held out such high hopes for, were at an 
impasse. 
During the last four months of 1811, Madison and 
Monroe wrote often of the likelihood of war. Monroe wrote 
his friend, Lord Holland, claiming he had entered office 
"with the best disposition to promote ... an accommodation of 
all differences" which he claimed was also "unquestionably 
the wish of the President." Unfortunately, he continued, 
Britain only gave "evidence of a determined hostility" to 
American rights. Monroe accused Britain of trying "to push 
things to the worst" and implied that America now had its 
back to the wall. "War, dreadful as the alternative is, 
could not do us more injury and it would certainly be more 
honorable to the nation. " 2° For his part, Madison wrote 
John Quincy Adams, sounding much like Thomas Jefferson 
before him: 
The question to be decided ... by Congress, 
according to present appearances, simply is, 
whether all the trade to which the orders 
[in council] are and shall be applied, is to 
be abandoned, or the hostile operation of [the 
orders in council], be hostilely resisted. 21 
This was a dramatic turn about from the beginning of the 
year and shows just how great the disappointment in the 
failed negotiations was. 
Madison's message at the opening of the new Congress 
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was accordingly designed to convince the British ministers 
that the Orders in Council needed to be immediately 
revoked. In the speech Madison warned that, "The period is 
arrived which claims from the legislative guardians of the 
national rights a system of more ample provisions for 
maintaining them." As reasons for this he stressed the 
Orders though he also spoke of "other wrongs, so long and 
so loudly calling for" a remedy; a reference to 
impressment. Great Britain, he said, remained firm in 
"hostile inflexibility" and thus America had to put itself 
"into an armor and an attitude demanded by the crisis, and 
corresponding with the national spirit and expectation." 
He recommended Congress "augment the regular military, 
strengthen the state militias, build up the navy and secure 
and store arms and munitions. " 22 Despite the tone of the 
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message it seems probable that even at this point Madison 
had no real desire for war but was instead simply trying to 
show the British that America meant business. 
Pushed by war hawks, Congress passed the requested 
military legislation, though some members were still 
hesitant. 23 Senator George W. Campbell of Tennessee said 
America had "suffered national degradation too long, and 
endured insult and injury with too much patience." It was 
"extremely difficult to perceive how war can be avoided 
without degrading the national character still lower than 
it is.''M This was typical of the pro-war sentiments which 
often reflected upon a loss of national honor if action 
were not soon taken. Congressman Richard Johnson of 
Kentucky took this argument to its ultimate extreme when he 
claimed that America "must now oppose the further 
encroachment of Great Britain by war or formally annul the 
Declaration of Independence, and acknowledge ourselves her 
devoted colonies."~ That this extreme, and somewhat 
ludicrous, statement was greeted with utter solemnity 
indicates how far towards war the pendulum had swung. A 
week later, Peter Porter, chair of the House Foreign 
Affairs Committee, recommended America go to war unless 
Britain rescinded the Orders in Council and agreed to "some 
satisfactory arrangements" on impressment.M In the 
government, Rufus King was virtually alone in his belief 
that France had proceeded "to mislead a nation torn asunder 
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by faction and blinded to her most important interests. " 27 
This was, however, a reiteration of the British point of 
view, which was unpopular in Washington at this time. 
Impressment, as the statement by Peter Porter shows, 
was again becoming an issue, though this time because it 
helped fan the flames of war. Senator Felix Grundy claimed 
impressment was "over and above the unjust pretensions" of 
the Orders in Council. Henry Clay said he could 
not ... overlook the impressment of our seamen; an aggression 
upon which he never reflected without feelings of 
indignation, which would not allow him appropriate language 
to describe its enormity. " 29 This was undoubtedly a true 
sentiment, but Clay also knew that impressment was a 
volatile subject which could be used to stir general public 
indignation against England. 
Realizing what was happening, foreign minister Foster 
wrote back to Lord Castlereagh, warning him that, 
Very inflammatory paragraphs ... on the subject of 
impressment have lately been circulated in the 
American papers, and as the causes of war become 
more closely canvassed ... impressment seems to be 
dwelt upon with considerable vehemence. 1130 
Once more, there is no indication that this warning has 
taken into consideration. No action was taken upon ito 
By early 1812 the Madison administration had all but 
given up on a peaceful solution. The President could see 
nothing in the conduct of Great Britain to indicate 
anything but "an adherence to her mad policy towards the 
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United States." The combination of pro-war politics in 
Congress and lack of positive action from London helped 
contribute to Madison's new bleaker view of affairs. Then, 
on March 20, Minister Foster received new instructions. 
Unfortunately they changed nothing. "Honor and interest" 
required the Orders in Council to be "executed by forceo 11 
American arms "must be met by British Cruizers according to 
the necessity of the case. " 32 With these words Britain's 
last opportunity to avert the oncoming crisis was lost. On 
receipt of these new orders Madison wrote to Jefferson that 
since Great Britain seemed to "prefer" war, America had 
"nothing left, therefore, but to make ready for ito 1133 
Congress agreed and quickly passed a new embargo bill 
proposed by Henry Clay. 34 America was set on the road to 
war. 
Monroe immediately began to stress impressment in an 
effort to underscore Britain's guilt, he described England 
as "[taking] the lead in the career of violence and 
injustice" and specified impressments.~ Again, the subject 
was used as a shortcut for getting the American public 
primed for the upcoming battle. 
Foster received yet another set of instructions, this 
time from the new foreign secretary, Robert Stewart, but 
these were as disappointing as the last set. Stewart 
claimed France had only made: 
some partial and insidious relaxations of [the 
Berlin and Milan Decrees] ... as an encouragement 
to America to adopt a system beneficial to France 
and injurious to Great Britain. 
Britain, despite assurance of war with America, was not 
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going to budge from its original position. Madison 
believed that this position was that the Orders in Council 
would be repealed in relation to America if France did 
likewise. Now the foreign secretary claimed Britain had 
"never engaged to repeal those Orders, as affecting America 
alone, leaving them in force against other States. 1136 In 
other words, France would have to drop her Decrees against 
all nations before Britain would do likewise. Years later, 
Madison confided that it was at this point "no choice 
remained but between war and degradation. 1137 It is hard to 
argue with him. The only way for America to placate Great 
Britain would have been to convince France to drop her 
decrees against England, an action which would have gained 
France absolutely nothing. Avenues of escape seemed 
exhausted, there· was only one road left to travel. 
In his message of June 1, 1812, Madison recommended 
consideration of "whether the United States shall continue 
passive under these progressive usurpations and these 
accumulated wrongs." His list of grievances included the 
Orders in Council and impressment. "Against this crying 
enormity which Great Britain would be so prompt to avenge 
if committed against herself, the United States have in 
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vain exhausted remonstrances and expostulations. " 38 The 
speech was the last little push needed. Not surprisingly, 
the House declared war on Great Britain on June 4. 39 
By emphasizing impressment the administration 
committed itself to a peace which settled the impressment 
issue. The Committee on Foreign Relations indicated on 
June 3, that it made sense to do so. If the practice 
continued it would be "impossible for the United States to 
consider themselves an independent nation. 1140 The 
administration was ready to back those words to the hilt. 
Shortly after the Senate declared war, Monroe sent the 
government's terms to Jonathan Russell, the charge 
d'affairs in London. Before there could be peace Britain 
had to end impressment and restore all impressed American 
sailors. There could be no compromise. 41 
CHAPTER VIII 
EPILOGUE, 1812-1818 
Wartime diplomacy focused on impressment since it 
almost immediately became the only reason for the fighting. 
On June 23, 1812, just twelve days after America declared 
war, Britain's foreign secretary announced revocation of 
the Orders in Council. 1 It had been hoped this would 
convince America to cease hostilities but the Madison 
administration, perhaps flushed with their quick diplomatic 
victory, pushed for the repeal of impressment. 2 
Late in the fall of 1812, Monroe and Albert Gallatin 
drafted a bill to disallow the use of British sailors on 
American merchant ships. America would renounce the use of 
foreign sailors if their country of origin did the same for 
Americans. The measure would not affect foreign sailors 
already naturalized or in the process of naturalization 
before the end of the war. 3 This bill passed both houses 
of Congress after debate, near the end of February, 1813G 4 
However, Lord Castlereagh, once again the foreign 
secretary, continued to stress the impossibility of 
renouncing impressment. 5 He instructed his commissioners 
on July 28, 1814, "to ascertain whether the American 
negotiators have any specific measures to propose for 
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obviating the alleged abuses of which they complain." 
Apparently the bill renouncing foreign sailors didn't 
count. Castlereagh then claimed his government would 
"weigh" American proposals "dispassionately ... with a desire 
to conciliate." Yet he also emphasized that Britain could: 
never recede from the principle of holding 
their own subjects to their duty of allegiance. 
The right of [impressment] can never be given 
up ... in exchange for any municipal regulation. 6 
The American bill, then, was not specific enough. 
Impressment remained a subject on which Britain would not 
give an inch. 
It turned out they wouldn't have to. By the time 
these instructions were printed America had abandoned its 
sine qua non on impressment allowing its negotiators to 
accept a treaty silent on the issue. This was a dramatic 
reversal of the earlier position. In early 1813, Monroe 
had sent his instructions, demanding Britain abandon 
impressment at sea. To let the topic pass in silence would 
be to give up "all claim to neutral rights, and all other 
rights on the Ocean." A month later Monroe added that a 
silence which trusted "to a mere understanding ... would not 
be that security which the United States have a right to 
expect. 117 Madison's attitude is unsurprising; at this 
point the war was young and America knew that Britain was 
in virtual isolation in its war with France. 
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When, on June 24, 1814, President Madison asked the 
cabinet if they wanted to drop the sine qua non they were 
against it. Soon after news came of the firm stand Britain 
was taking on impressment as well as the collapse of 
Napoleon. On the 27th the cabinet voted unanimously to 
accept silence on the issue. 8 Clearly their anger toward 
impressment did not extend to facing the British navy 
alone. 
For their part, the American negotiators at Ghent, 
Albert Gallatin, John Quincy Adams, Henry Clay, James A. 
Bayard and Jonathan Russell, had always been in doubt about 
the wisdom of the sine qua non. Adams had argued that it 
would be best to "leave the question just where it is, 
saying nothing about it. "9 When the Americans learned that 
Britain agreed not to ask for positive approval of 
impressment they quickly let the entire issue drop. The 
peace treaty was signed on Christmas Eve, 1814, bypassing 
impressment entirely. 
Yet the issue refused to die. Napoleon returned from 
exile on Elba in March, 1815. Britain, fearing a new 
Anglo-French war, again began pressing United States 
sailors, risking American wrath. In June, Castlereagh told 
Adams that "the Admiralty was now occupied in prescribing 
regulations for the naval officers which he hoped would 
prevent all cause of complaint. " 10 The British fear was 
that their practice would again lead to war, but such was 
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not the case. When Madison proposed new legislation 
limiting the use of British sailors as a spur for 
negotiation, Congress balked. In February, 1815 the matter 
was put off to the next session and in December it was 
allowed to die. 11 It seems that America had never truly 
intended to go to war over impressment, but had found 
itself in the situation during the War of 1812 quite by 
accident. The majority of the members of the United States 
government were unwilling to make that mistake again. 
Given this it is almost humorous that at this point 
Britain seemed finally to have a change of heart. Lord 
Liverpool, First Lord of the Treasury, feared that Britain 
would "never be engaged in a Maritime War with any Power 
without its leading to a war with the United States." 
Still the Lord could see no acceptable substitute for 
"detention" as impressment was now called. America had "to 
admit the power of Detention under any circumstances." On 
this he felt "the Success of any Negotiation will dependo " 12 
This was a rather unlikely thing to expect to happen, and 
the British knew it. The Earl Bathurst, Secretary of State 
for War and Colonies was sure that impressment would once 
again lead to war: 
After what has passed the U. States cannot 
submit to the exercise of this right. It must 
predispose them against us in every War in 
which we shall be engaged, and it ensures to 
every European State, a certain Ally, in their 
hostility against us. 13 
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Despite these fears the situation remained unchanged until 
1818. 
On April 18, 1818, Richard Rush, the new envoy to 
Great Britain, on orders from Secretary of state John 
Quincy Adams, offered once more to exclude from United 
States service "all British subjects or seamen now in the 
United States ... not heretofore naturalized" in return for 
renunciation of impressment at sea. 14 Unbeknownst to the 
Americans, Lord Castlereagh already had cabinet approval 
for the plan. He had previously told them that impressment 
was "the Question of all others between the two Governments 
which has most operated to exasperate." If this agreement 
got Americans "to give adequate effect to their own 
policy ... Gt. Britain will have not only gained her main 
object, but escape the danger of an American War. " 15 It 
seemed that the long and costly debate over impressment was 
finally at an end. Castlereagh revealed his cabinet 
approval, and, almost unbelievably, America remained 
unmoved. 16 
Why? Castlereagh had suggested that: 
the reserve which the United States would require 
in favor of British subjects already Naturalized 
might be guarded by requiring a List of all 
Persons so claiming to be furnished within a 
time to be limited. 17 
This was exactly the kind of paperwork the States had been 
shying away from for years. The American administration 
refused Castlereagh's offer using the old argument that it 
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might endanger sailors who could accidentally be omitted. 
"Upon impressment we have again completely failed." 
Richard Rush reported to ex-President Madison. "I fear 
sir, that it will only be left to some future 
administration to follow ... the precedent of a remedy which 
you were forced at last to set. " 18 The negotiations then 
foundered and were soon after called off. 
With this impressment virtually vanished from the 
diplomacy of the two countries, though it continued in 
practice. No future administration ever did follow 
Madison's path. America, it seems, after long argument and 
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